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PART I




Since the 7th century (or perhaps even earlier), Japan’s legal,
political, social, and cultural systems have been constructed,
deconstructed,andreconstructedundertheinfluenceofearth-
quake-likeshocksoriginatingontheneighboringAsianconti-
nent. In themodernera,with technologicaladvancements in
commerceandcommunication,Japanhashadtosituateitself
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and taking onChina and theAlliedPowers in the 930s and
940s over Manchurian resources and Southeast Asian oil
supplies.
OneofthegreatestchallengesforscholarsofEastAsia,and








aggression because of the reactions he knew it would elicit
fromJapan’sneighbors,greatandsmall.isissageadvicefor
hegemonsofanyera.But,ifAsakawahadbeenwritingabout
Japan’s contemporary foreign policy environment, he would
have noticed two radically different factors that would have
influencedhisadvice.First,Japanisnowademocraticcountry
inwhichthemilitaryissubjecttociviliancontrol,shiftingthe
spotlight from the hubris of generals to the decision-making
capacityofthevotingpublic.Second,theinternationaleconomic
integration that had just begun in his day has now vastly
increasedthecostsofoutrightmilitaryconflictforthecountries
oftheregion,andthestakesarehigherthanever.Asakawawas





Lineage of His ought on Peace and Diplomacy
Acenturyago,whenAsakawaKan’ichi,aprofessorofJapanese
economichistoryatYale,wroteas a concernedcitizenabout
Japan’s foreign policy, EastAsian geopoliticswas particularly
volatile.ecenterofgravityinworldpolitics,ashesawitin








the powers” had broken apart the system on which colonial
imperialismrested.
Writing in 904,1 Asakawa harbored hope for aworld of
freetradeandinternationaljustice—aworldorderthatlooked
strikingly Kantian.2 By forcing Russia out of Manchuria, he
believed Japanhadbecomea “midwife” for thisneworder in
which Japan would help to police the territorial integrity of
bothChinaandKorea.By909,however,whenhewroteJapan’s





other foxes would have none of it, and eventually the world




selves. In his own words, “I find, once again, how little the
unconscious habits of the mental workings of nations are
Japan and the World: In Honor of Asakawa Kan‘ichi3
understoodtooneanother,indeed,howlittleeachisawareof
its own.”3 If only the Japanese government had been able to
foresee the price tag on its territorial ambitions, they would
havechosenthepeacefulcoursethathehadurgedfortyyears
earlier.Butmaking thesecalculations requires twoprocesses:
discerningwhatothercountriesarelikelytodoundervarious
scenarios and weighing the possible options with respect to
domestic politics. e opportunities for miscalculation are
myriadatbothlevels.
HadAsakawabeenapoliticalscientist,hemighthavetheo-
rized about the way different domestic political institutions
shapethedecisionmakingenvironmentmoresystematically.A













become a full-fledged democracy, with a long-established
record of elections, parliamentarism, and civilian control of
themilitary.Asakawa, if hewere alive,would likely bemore
optimisticaboutJapan’sforeignpolicyconduct.Intoday’sworld,
ChinaandNorthKorea,notJapan,maintainregimesinwhich
governments are not accountable to the public in anymean-






ment to peace through international economic and political
exchange.
Kant himself, the grandfather of the “democratic peace”
theory,wasnot,infact,asenamoredofmajoritariandemocracy







inject appropriate doses of caution into decisions about war
andpeace.
Since the time of Kant, political theorists have come to
considermoresubtlewaysthatdemocraciescanvary,including
thewayselectoralrulesshapetheaccountabilityofpoliticians
to their voting publics. It is possible tomakemore nuanced
predictionsaboutJapan’sfuturecourse,takingintoconsidera-
tionsomeofthemajorinstitutionalchangesthathaveoccurred
in recent years. For example,now that Japanhas changed its
electoral rules—since 994—to a largelymajoritarian system,
Japan’s foreign policy decision-making is in somewaysmore





in the political middle (even though the disappearance of a
strong leftmayalsoweakentheresistancetohawkish leader-
ship).Moreover,Japanhasbecomeintegratedintointernational
economic institutions and norms that set the stage for a
constructivegive-and-takebetweenJapanandtheworld.Inthe
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5
followingchaptersofthisvolume,wereturntothesesubstantive
questionsthatwouldhavefascinatedAsakawa.








threat to Japan. Japanese rulers kept an eye on the Korean
peninsulaagainstthepossibilityofChineseencroachment,and
the Mongols of the 3th century were thwarted by “divine











Japanese businesses welcome and prosper from China’s
growingbuyingpower,tobesure.Astheliberaltheoryofinter-




ence intentions. If bargaining power comes from the relative
costs and benefits of using force, China is clearly gaining an
advantage.eJapanesefeelingofuneaseisamplifiedbyChina’s
 MasaruKohno andFrancesRosenbluth
persistentnettlingon thehistoryquestionand its implacable
opposition to amoreprominent role for Japan in theUnited
NationsSecurityCouncil.
So, today, Japan once again faces a thorny foreign policy
environment, albeit one different from the world Asakawa
inhabited. China, no longer a helpless victim of predatory
powers, is asserting a leadership role grounded in resources













increase in global clout.emajoritarian cast of Japan’snew
electoral rules forces greater attention on issues with broad
appeal, and createsnewdomestic accountabilitymechanisms
that shape foreign economic and security policies. Japan is




e Plan of the Book
ebookthatfollowshastwoprimarygoals.efirst,presented
inPartI,celebratesthelifeandintellectuallegacyofAsakawa
Kan’ichi. Born in 874 in Nihonmatsu in northern Japan,
Asakawawas the son of a samurai in a “rebel” province that
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to the United States where he mastered English, eventually







st century—Asakawa’s life straddled much of the first and
secondperiods.Asakawa’spersonalstruggletounderstandand
interpretJapan’sroleintheworldprovidesalensthroughwhich
toview Japan’s geopolitical challenges andcompare the chal-
lengesofthattimewiththoseJapanfacestoday.Asakawa’s909
book, Japan’s Crisis, criticized Japan’s aggressive policy in
ManchuriaaftertheRusso-JapanesewarandurgedthatJapan
continuetorespectChina’ssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.
Today, the tables have turned and Japan feels threatened by
Chinaasneverbefore.HowJapandealswiththesenewfeelings




Asakawa’s primary area of scholarship, medieval Japanese
economichistory,whichplacesJapan’seconomicandpolitical
development in comparison with that of the west. Asakawa












detractors, as well as Asakawa’s ongoing conversations with
governmentofficialsandothersaboutJapaneseforeignpolicy
choices.YabukimakesthecasethatAsakawaplayedacentral




remained bitterly disappointed, until his death in 948, that
JapanfailedtohonorChina’sandKorea’ssovereigntyaspledged
inthePortsmouthTreaty.
Parts ii and iii of thebook turn to Japan’s contemporary
challenges, both economic andmilitary. Part ii examines the




argues that international engagement has caused values to
change so that Japan has shifted its foreign economic policy
fromaneomercantilistictoalargelyneoliberalone.Beginning
inthe970swhenJapanbeganrunningchronictradesurpluses,
Japan endureddecades of pressure from its tradingpartners,
principallytheUnitedStates,toopenJapanesemarketstotrade
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market trendsmay provide support for the bank’s continued
independence.ischapteremphasizesthattheslowtransfor-
mation of Japan’s political economy is shaped by not only
domestic concerns, but also global economic integration,
competitivemarketpressures,andthedevelopmentofinterna-




Japan’s status as the second largest donor behind theUnited
States to both institutions. Lipscy argues that Japan (or any
countryotherthanperhapstheUnitedStates)isconstrainedin











Fund (imf). Japan needs the imf more than it needs Japan,
whereasthereverseistrueinthecaseoftheWorldBank.
OnemightconcludefromthesethreechaptersthatJapanis




Japan faces regionallyandglobally. Inchapter8,KentCalder
describesJapan’sandChina’sstrategiccompetitionforenergy
resourcesandconsidersitsimplications.ChinaandJapanonce
had largely complementary economies,withChina supplying
Japan with raw materials and labor intensive manufactured
products,andJapansupplyingChinawithhightechnologyand
high value-addedproducts and services.Now thatChinahas
undergoneextensiveindustrialization,JapanandChinaincreas-
inglyfindthemselvescompetingforthesamescarceresources
to fuel their economies. Conflict over resources has become
chronicandrequiresastutepoliticalmanagementonbothsides,
whichisoftenlacking.
In chapter 9, Gregory Noble provides a window on the
Japanesebusinesscommunity’sviewofSino-Japaneserelations.
is chapter pits realist theories of international relations
(focusing on power and resources) against liberal ones (that
considerbusinessincentives)byexaminingtheevolvingstance
of Japanese business executives and organizations towards
China.CompetitionwithChinahasincreasedinthemanufac-
turing sector as well as in competition for resources, but on
balance, the profits that Japanese companies earn in their
ventures in China are powerful inducements to keep Sino-
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Inchapter0,FrancesRosenbluth,SaitoJun,andAnnalisa
Zinn take up the question of Japanese nationalism and ask
whetherJapan’sneighborsoughttofearsignsofitsrise.Inthe
eyes of Japan’s neighbors, Japan shows a shocking lack of
remorseforthedepredationsofWorldWarii.Textbookrevi-
sions,visitstotheYasukuniShrinetothewardead,andtalkof
revising Japan’s “peace constitution” signal to them a callous
disregardatbest;atworst,theyareharbingersofrisingnation-






on account of Japan’s new electoral rules, adopted in 994,
whichgivepoliticiansincentivetoappealtovotersonthebasis
ofpublicpolicyissues,inbothforeignanddomesticpolicy.But















party platform.e consequences are interesting to contem-
plate,butitremainstobeseeniftheprimeminister’sforeign
 MasaruKohno andFrancesRosenbluth
policy control provides an avenue for the public to hold the
governmentmorecloselyincheck,givenhiselectoralvulnera-
bility,or ifhewillbeabletomanipulatepublicopinionmore
easily than before. Democratic politics includes elements of
bothphenomena,andcompetitionbyaviableoppositionseems
crucialtoensuringthestrengthofapopularcheck.
Taken together, the chapters inPart iii find that regional
and global challenges that Japan faces are real, but Japanese
preferences are complex, andmany important industries are
determined to keep the relationship harmonious. Moreover,








Japan has become politically majoritarian and economically
neoliberal, giving Japan more structural resemblance to the
United States and the United Kingdom than was true in its
mercantilistpast.Japan’seconomyisreorganizingaroundmore
fluid capital and labor markets and is beginning to shed its
predatory image.ese structural changes would have given














 e Japan-Russia Conflict.
 ImmanuelKant(inPerpetual Peace,794)heldouthopethataworld
oftradingnationswouldbepeacefullyinclined,becausetradegives
exporters an interest in the prosperity of importing nations.is




racies,”Journal of Conflict Resolution.
5 isideaisatleastasoldasMontesquieu’slogicof“doux commerce”
(Spirit of the Laws, 75) and Immanuel Kant’s prescription for
perpetualpeace(Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,795).
4 MasaruKohno andFrancesRosenbluth
PART ii




ichi in a historical context. More specifically, it will trace
Asakawa’sAmericanjourneyandtheevolutionoftherelation-













However, as the New Testament states, “No prophet is
accepted inhis country.” (Luke4:24.)Asakawa’swarningwas
notheeded.Hisplea for Japantoundertakea lessselfishand
moreprincipledChinapolicydidnotresonateamonghisfellow

Asakawa Kan’ichi’s American Journey: 
Its Time and Place 























theforcesbehind it inan impassionateandobjective fashion.
















relationship in a global context. is is why his American
journeyisstillrememberedandcherished.
Asakawa’s American Journey and Japan-US Relations
Asakawa’slifeparallelsthefirstonehundredyearsofJapan-US
relations.OfficialJapan-USrelationsbeganwiththearrivalof
CommodorePerryandhisEast IndiaFleet in theEdoBay in
53.Hence, the year 2003was the 50th anniversary of that
visit.ese50yearsofthebilateralrelationshipcanbebroken




Asakawa lived through most of the first two fifty-year
periods. He was born in 4 in the town of Nihonmatsu,




He arrived in San Francisco in 95 for the purpose of
studyingatDartmouthCollege.ItwastheyearinwhichChina
cededTaiwantoJapanasaresultoftheSino-JapaneseWar,and
three years before Spain ceded the Philippines to theUnited
States as a result of the Spanish-AmericanWar. Because of







War. Two years later, he started teaching at Yale.He died in




Asakawa’s lifebeganduring thefirsthalfof thefirstfifty-
year period of Japan-US relations.is was a period during
whichJapanandtheUnitedStatescontinuedtodealwitheach







public opinion toward Japan had quickly turned from being
very favorable before and during the Russo-JapaneseWar to















e Civil War of 1868–1869 and the Fate of Rebel Samurai
In this connection, it is important tonote thatAsakawa’s life
andhisAmericanjourneyweregreatlyimpactedbythethree
20Agawa Naoyuki
wars that occurredduring thefirst onehundred years of the
bilateral relationship.eyare theCivilWarof 6–69 in
Japan, theRusso-JapaneseWar of 904–905, and thePacific
Warof94–945.
esignificanceforAsakawaofthelattertwowarsrequires
no explanation. e Russo-Japanese War marked a turning








It is,however, theWarof 6–69 in Japan that eventually
inducedandenabledAsakawaandmanyotheryoungJapanese
oftheperiodtocomeandstudyintheUnitedStates.
e arrival of the black ships led by Commodore Perry
destabilizedthepoliticalsituationinJapan.ealreadyweak-
enedShogungovernmenteventuallycollapsed.elastShogun
returned sovereignty to the emperor in 6. However, the
samurai from the south, who both supported andwere sup-
portedbytheemperor,hadnotyetbeguntofight.Manywere
descendantsofthesamuraiwhohadfoughtagainstandlostto
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evictoryof theemperor’sarmy in thiswaragainst the
troops loyal to theoldShogunregime, like thevictoryof the
UniontroopsfouryearsearlieragainsttheConfederatetroops
in theUnited States,meant profound changes in the lives of
thousandsofJapanesepeople.Itusheredinthemodernization








discrimination against those in thenorthwhohad foughton
theothersideofthecause.Infact,tothisdatetheirdeadhave
not been enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine.Having fought a
war against the emperor, they were labeled rebels. Like the
SouthernersintheReconstructioneraintheUnitedStates,the









deprived of regular salaries based on the rice harvest, faced
severeeconomichardship.
In fact,many samurai from Satsuma and elsewhere who
fought asmembersof the emperor’s armyduring theWarof
6–69failedtoadapttothenewsystemandfeltbetrayed.
SomeofthemeventuallyrebelledagainsttheMeijigovernment
and were brutally crushed by the regular army of the new
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regime in 0s. Many of the government soldiers who put
downtheSatsumarebellioninwereformerrebelsamurai,
who had been attacked by the Satsuma samurai eight years
earlier.
erefore, itwasahandicap tobea sonordaughterofa
poorsamuraiintheearlyMeijiera,especiallyifonewasfroma





Rebels’ Sons and Daughters Go to America




SutematsuYamakawa,who at age twelvewas one of the five
younggirlstheMeijigovernmentsenttotheUnitedStatesto
study,wasactuallyadaughteroftheprimeministerservingthe
LordofAizu, a staunch supporter of Shogun.TsudaUmeko,







Nitobe Inazo,who later authoredoneof themostwidely
readbooksonJapanintheUnitedStatesbeforeWorldWarii,
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went tostudy in theUnitedStates—Nitobeat JohnsHopkins
andUchimuraatAmherst.
Asakawawas a son of a samurai serving the Lordship of
Nihonmatsu,arebelprefecture.Hismother’slatehusband,the
onlysonoftheAsakawafamily,wasasamuraiandamemberof
a large, radical, anti-West group who was killed during an




familywoulddieout.erefore,Asakawa’s father, the second
sonofaseparatefamily,marriedhismotherandadoptedthe
Asakawaname,atraditionalwaytocontinuethefamily.







entering the new government and being appointed to high
positions.isdoesnotmean,however,theywerebannedfrom




other pro-Imperial prefectures. ey formed powerful and
inpenetratablefactionswithinthegovernment.Forthesamurai
of the former rebel prefectures, receiving aquality education
abroad and returning homewith new scientific, engineering,
medical,andotheradvancedknowledge,aswellastheskillsto










Nevertheless, America was a muchmore open and wel-
coming society than some European countries for the rebel
samurai’s sonsanddaughters.Mostof thegovernment spon-
soredstudentswenttoEuropetostudywheretheyestablished
contactswith theelitesof thehostcountries.Rebel samurai’s
sonshadnosuchcontactsandcouldnotcompetewiththeelite
Japanesestudents. InAmerica,however,philanthropicChris-














nist who died in Stalin’s Moscow in 933, worked his way
throughvariousAmericancollegesbetween4and96and
publishedabookonhisreturntoJapanentitledA Guidebook
for America.2 In it, he urged young Japanese to study in the
UnitedStatesbecause,ashestated,“Americahassympathyfor
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those poor students who have a strong desire to study.” He
continued:




is message must have sounded enchanting to the rebel
samurai’ssonswhowerepoor,buteagertostudy.
Asakawa Arrives in the United States
ItiswiththisbackgroundandtraditionthatAsakawaarrivedin
America in 95.His father, a rebel samurai, and his second
mother, a Shintopriest’s daughter (hismotherdiedwhenhe
wasthree),toldhimthestoriesofhisfamilymembers,relatives,
andfriendsfightingagainsttheemperor’sarmy.eyinstilled















tocarryout the simple,happy storyof a samurai’s songoing
eastandcominghomeasuccessstory.Nitobe,Katayamaand
Uchimura had all started their study in theUnited States in
26Agawa Naoyuki
4, some ten years before Asakawa. ey tended to have
positiveviewsofAmerica.True,Uchimurawasindeeddeeply
disappointed with the reality of the seemingly materialistic,
gambling,violent,corrupt,andrace-discriminatingAmerican


























immigrants.e two countries were no longer romanticized
andbenevolentstrangerstoeachother,butpotentiallythreat-
eningrivals.us,thesecondfifty-yearperiodbegan.
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Asakawa during the Second fifty-year Period
Asakawa was keenly aware of this change in the American
public’sperceptionofthebilateralrelationship.Hewasperson-
allyinvolvedinanefforttoimproveAmericanpublicopinion
toward Japan in connection with Japan’s going to war with
Russia.Asakawaconductedaseriesoflectures,wrotearticles,
andpublishedabookinEnglish,e Russo-Japanese Conflict:
Its Causes and Issues,4 supporting Japan’spositionduring the
war.HismainmessagewasthatJapanwasfightingthiswarto
protectChina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity aswell as
equalmarketopportunitiesforallpowersinChina.Heassured
theAmericans that Japanhadno territorial ambition andno
intenttomonopolizeManchuria.
Afterthewar,however,thereweresignsthatJapanwasnot
going tokeep itspromises. Japanbegan tomonopolizeMan-
churia.American views of Japan changed.is came as very
badnewsforAsakawa.Inhisletterin90toOkumaShigenobu,
hismentorand founderofhis almamater,Waseda,Asakawa
pointedout that “a suddenshift inAmericanopinion toward
Japanisanunbelievablephenomenon,onethathasnoprecedent
sincethebeginningofhistory.”5 Deeplydismayed,hepublished









intellectuals to regain the trustofAmericansand to improve
the American public opinion toward Japan.6 In his letter to
OkumaShigenobuin93,hecategoricallystated:
2 Agawa Naoyuki





temporary socializing activities, and have extremely weak
foundational principles. True [American] intellectuals will
laughatthem,causingmoreharmthangood.7
Hethuscriticizedothers’effortstoimprovetherelationship
through dialogues, admittedly in a somewhat condescending









hard one tries to deal with current issues, the [American]
listenerswould takemypresentationswith theassumption
that I amnot free from Japanesebiases. If so, even if such
effortsattracttheattentionofmany,andevenifthatisgood
forJapan,theywillbeoflittleacademicvalue.Benefitsfrom
such undertakings, if any, are of temporary nature and
doubtfulvalue.atiswhatIexperiencedthroughmylectures
and writings during and after the Russo-JapaneseWar. …
Suchspeechesandpublicationsarenotexpected tohavea
longtermimpactonJapan-USrelations.8
Coinciding with his disillusionment with Japan’s foreign
policy and his decision to concentrate on academic work,
Asakawahad to facea seriesofhardships inhispersonal life
during the secondfifty-year period. First, hisAmericanwife,
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Miriam,passedawayin93.eyhadbeenmarriedforonly
eightyearsandtheyhadnochildren.Asakawawasleftalone.
Five years after Miriam’s death, he met Sophia Arabella
Irwin in Tokyo and fell in love with her. Bella, as she was
called,wasborninJapanin3.HerfatherwasanAmerican
businessman and her mother a Japanese woman whom her
fathermet in the early days ofMeiji in Yokohama. Asakawa
askedBellatomarryhim,butBelladidnotsayyes.Hedidnot




death andpartly becausehewaswilling tomove toTokyo if
Bella said yes. One year after Miriam’s death, when Okuma
becameprimeministerofJapan,Asakawawrotealettertohim
indicating that hewould be happy to go home andwork for
Japan in whatever field if he could be involved in important
nationalmatters.9 Healsowroteaseriesoflettersbetween920
and924tohismentor,TsubouchiShoyo,requestingateaching
position atWaseda.10 Asakawa complained that he had very
fewstudentstowhomhecouldteachJapanesehistoryatYale
andexpressedhisbeliefthathewouldbemoreusefullyengaged
atWaseda.Despite repeated and sometimes desperate pleas,
Asakawa’s requestwasnot granted.He stoppedwriting for a
teaching position after 924, when Bella finally refused his
proposal.
AsakawawasalsounhappyaboutthewayYaletreatedhim
as a teacher.Hewas appointed a full-time lecturer atYale in
90andpromotedtoAssistantProfessorofEastAsianHistory






History in 92 andwas promoted toAssociate Professor of
History in 930. However, he was then appointed Research
AssociateinHistoryin933.Asakawatookthisasademotion
and in 936wrotea lettercomplainingabout thisdecision to
thepresidentofYale,J.R.Angel:













deficiency, which interpretation can be no more than of
personalsignificance,orascribeittoanenormityinothers,









interpret this decision as an instanceof racial discrimination
against a Japanese professor at Yale. Perhaps because of this
letter,hewasfinallymadeProfessorofHistory in93, thirty
yearsafterhestartedteachingatYale.




Asakawa may have suspected that there could have been a
racialreasonwhyhewasnotpromotedtoafullprofessorship
forsuchalongtime.
In fact, it appears that Asakawa was sometimes over-
whelmedbytheswellingofanti-JapanesefeelingsintheUnited
States,amongboththegeneralpublicandpolicymakersduring





interest there before wwi.12 He was outraged when Japan
submittedanote toChina listing twenty-one itemsofmostly
unreasonabledemandssoonthereafter.





to theUnitedKingdom, and told them thatwidespread anti-
Japanese feeling in theWest was a result of an international
Jewishconspiracy.
IfImayfreelyexpressmyguess,thispowerfulgrouphas
an objective of expanding its influence worldwide. Its one
temporary,butimportant,tacticistheexclusionofJapan.In
ordertodoso, itaimsatseveringtheAnglo-Japanalliance
and isolating Japan at the proposed [Washington] inter-
national conference. en, it will seek to thwart Japan’s
economicandpoliticalexpansionand,ifnecessary,willstop




of the Elders as translated by Henry Ford.14 Although he
correctlyconcludedthatthiswasafake,heneverthelessstated







came toAmerica later thanAsakawa in the secondfifty-year
periodhadamorerealistic,butmuchlesssympatheticattitude
towardAmerica.Forinstance,TaniJoji,apopularwriterwho
spent six years in America between 9 and 924, had very




he got to knowmany Japanese immigrants at the bottom of
Americansociety.WhenhereturnedtoJapan,hewroteaseries
ofstoriescollectivelyentitled,e American Japs,15 inahumor-
ousyetcritical fashion. Tohim,discriminationagainstbarely
English-speaking,poor,uneducatedJapaneseimmigrantswasa





relationship. Yet he did not give up the hope that the worst
couldbe averted.at iswhyhe continued towrite to Japan



















recordsof self-reflection,anunavoidable feeling isone
of revulsion from the impressionone receives of one’s
having taken oneself too seriously for these successive


















trees are not particularly pretty as a rule, but their
shadows!Whatbeautyofeverylineofthem:thecurves
andforksoftrunksandlimbs,theindividualleavesand
theirensemble! ese shadowshaveopenedmyeye to
the real beauty hidden in the humble tree itself, and
educatedmedeeplytorespectit.17
Inthisletter,thereisanabsenceofthetonefoundinmany




mountains and river remain;/city in spring, grass and trees
burgeoning.”(translationbyBurtonWatson)
WerememberAsakawaasagreathistorianandaprophet.
In these capacities, he was a great man. And yet, it may be
fittingtorememberhimasanindividual,arebelsamurai’sson,
who struggled throughdifficult timesbetween Japan and the
UnitedStates.Hewasimperfectinmanyways.Hewasclumsy
insomeways.Hemademistakes.Hewassometimespreachy
and condescending, the very negative characteristics that he
oftenattributedtotheAmericans.
And yet, hewas sincere.He tried toovercomehisweak-
nesses.Henevergaveuptryingtoovercomethegapbetween
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Modern scholarshiphas convergedon








Meanwhile, the English language literature on medieval
Japan, written during the 160s by John Hall, Jeffrey Mass,
EdwinReischauer,andothers,maintainedthatJapanesefeudal-
ism was quite similar to decentralized western European
feudalism,becausetherelationshipbetweenseigniorandtenant
wasmutual.2 eybased their analyses in largeparton their
understandingofAsakawa’sbooksandarticles.
Asakawahimself,however,maintainedthatJapanesefeudal-
ismwas quite different fromWestern feudalism.He pointed
outthatmedievalJapanwasacomplicatedsocietythatallowed
multiplelegalprinciplestocoexistandthatthefeudalsystemin
Japan was transitional and unstable. Asakawa found more
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egalitarian, horizontal relationships by observing the actual
documentsoftheIrikivillage.
Sincethe170s,asareactionagainstMarxisthistoriography,
AminoYoshihiko,FujikiHisashi, andother Japanese scholars
havedevelopedadifferentviewaboutJapanesefeudalism.ey












of Asakawa’s view of Japanese economic history and briefly
consider the implications for our understanding of Japan’s
















1. All the land was owned by the state in the name of the
emperor.
2. Acentralizedadministrativegovernmentwasestablished.
. All farmlandwas rendered to the state and re-allotted to
theowners(Han-den-Shu-ju).
. Land was organized into hamlets or villages (Sato) with
unitsof50houses.
5. e government created new local governments led by a
governor(Koku-shi)whowaschosennotsomuchaccording
to clan (uji) connections but by political considerations.
usthereformattemptedtoeclipsethetraditionalclans
that had been in power and concentrate power in the
emperorandhis(her)entourages.
ereformsucceededpoliticallyinweakeningtheoldclans
in favor of the emperor. It failed as an economic reform,
however,formanyreasons.











only the central government but also the provincial offices
lackedsufficientadministrativecapabilitytokeeppacewiththe
changingconditionsoflandandtenants.Althoughthepurpose
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of the reform was to increase incentives for reclaiming the
wastelandratherthanreinvestingintensivelyinthedirectappli-
cation of an economic and legal system from the Chinese
dynasty, the foreign systemwasnotappropriate for theenvi-
ronmentinJapan,anditthereforefailed.
e Development of 
Manorial Lands (“Sho, Shoen”) in the Heian Period
AsanaturalreactiontothefailureoftheRitsuryoSystem,the
JapanesemanoriallandsystemknownasSho madeitsmodest
appearance in the 8th century and evolved through the 12th
century.Scholarsdistinguishtwotypesofmanors.
efirst is Immune Sho.6 Once a piece of landhad been
registeredbythegovernment,undertheRitsuryoSystemitwas
directly controlled by imperial, or central, institutions. is
formalpracticedidnotprovidesufficientincentiveforpeasants
to pursue productive activities because of the ever present
possibility that provincial governments would intervene or




part of newly cultivated land (Men-den) and subsequently
declared“administrativeimmunity”forapartoftheland.
esecondisSho of private origin.Farmerscouldcultivate




or released partial rights to the land to the patronage of a
personwithinfluenceortoaninstitutionthatplayedtheroleof
aseignior(Ryo-ke).is“commendation”ofland(Ki-shin)was
akindofmutual contract,which transferredpartial rightsof
landanddefinedtheobligationoftheparties.Asakawapoints
2Kambayashi RyoandHamada Koichi
out, “eydividedandredivided landed interest, itwouldbe
seen,asfarastheydared,andconveyedthemfrompersonto
























andintheworkofhispredecessor,NakadaKaoru, insists it is
importanttorecognizethedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesof
originsandalsothetwotypesofnexusintheSho system.7
e relationship between the government and a seignior
becamecrucialtothemanagementofanindividualSho. Normally
aseigniorhadpersonalservantscalledGe-nin.Asakawastressed
thatseigniorsused the transferofShiki asrewards toservants
(On-kyu)andexplained,“esurrenderofashiki byoneperson
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of a lower station to another of a higher was termed ki-shin,













e Role of Warriors in the Kamakura Period




















In Japan, the groups ofwarriors have been calledBu-shi,
andtheyestablishedtheirown“state”inKamakurain112.e
governanceduringtheKamakuraperiodandinthefollowing








purelypersonal andmoral and lessmaterial than in the later
ages” (p. 5). e mutual contractual element in the feudal
systeminJapancameaboutwhenthispatriarchalrelationship
began to utilize the transfers of Shiki to reward the vassals’
service(Go-on-Ho-ko)inpersonalrelationshipsintheseignior
families.e lord-vassal absolute relationship camefirst, and
thenthecommendation-patronageelementssupplementedit.
Atthesametime,becausetheShogunatepossessedoneof
the strongest influences, someseigniorsaswell as cultivators
commended their partial rights to ask the Shogunate for its
patronage (Hon-ryo-An-do). In this case, the commendation-
patronagerelationshipcamefirst,andthelord-vassalrelation-
shipfollowed.
In short, the patriarchal lord-vassal relationship became
intertwined with the commendation-patronage relationship,
and,asaresult,thefeudalsysteminmedievalJapanemerged.
AsAsakawacomments,“Whensomeofthe[shiki]eventually
passed into the hands of the private warrior—another inde-
pendentandpartly illegalproductof theage–feudaldevelop-
mentsbecameatlengthpossible”(Asakawa12,).
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transferability of Shiki became limited during the Kamakura
period, even in cases where the land had originally been
commendedorcontributedbythevassals.
e rights of a vassal as a land steward (Ji-to-Shiki) were






based in the easternpartof Japan.After the fall of theTaira
family, many eastern vassals were given Shiki of western
provinces in Japan, but their power as landlords was quite
limited. Irikiin, the source ofe Documents of Iriki, was an
excellent example of this kind of territory. Of course, those
vassalswho commended their land to a Shogunate generally
hadastrongerinfluenceintheirownterritory.
Although the rights of land stewards were limited, they
gradually gathered or centralized several Shiki, which were
relatedtocertaindomainstobuildupthetotalownershipofa
pieceofland(Ichi-en-Chi-gyo).Butthecentralizationoffeudal
Japan progressed slowly. ere were still Shiki-holders who
were subject to social relationships other than the one-sided
lord-vassal relationship. For example, imperial institutions as
wellastheirtenantskepttheirownShiki overtheterritory,and









among scholars regarding the timing of the completion. It is
commonknowledge,however,thatfeudalJapanmadeslowbut
steadyprogresstowardcentralization.
Asakawa’s Legacy in 
Current and Prospective Studies in Economic History
Asakawa’sviewsabout the transitionalnatureof feudal Japan
suggestfascinatingavenuesforfutureresearch.
1. ere were two contrasting relationships: one based on
one-sided personal obedience and the other on mutual
economic contracts.Many historians, includingAsakawa

































tutional Life of Japan ande Documents of Iriki,donerecentlyby
Professor Yabuki Susumu. His translations greatly facilitated our


















 Since the 1580s ToyotomiHideyoshi had collected documents on
landholdingandincomeandrecordedthedataforhisownpurposes.
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e story in the epigram about devour -
ing an entire dictionary provides an early glimpse of Asakawa
Kan’ichi’s intense commitment to scholarship. is remarkable
man lived out a life-long passion for historical knowledge. His
integrity as a scholar was matched by his integrity as a human
being, and throughout his life he dedicated his efforts to
exploring peaceful solutions to the problems of the world in
which he lived.
is chapter begins with some vignettes of Asakawa’s schol-
arship on medieval Japan and its reception in Japan and else-
where. Sections  and 4 turn to Asakawa’s vision for peace in
Asia and his unsung role in the Portsmouth Treaty.
                                                           
Asakawa Kan’ichi’s View of History
Yabuki Susumu
e Legend of the Asakawa Cherry Tree
Kan’ichi would memorize two pages
of the English-English dictionary daily, then literally
“devour” the pages, a practice in those days not un -
common. When the last pages were gone and only the
covers were left, Kan’ichi buried them at the foot of a
cherry tree on the school campus. e tree was known
as the Asakawa Cherry Tree.
G.G. Clark, 
Classmate of 1899, Dartmouth College
4
e Reception of Asakawa’s Scholarship in Japan
Asakawa’s scholarship on medieval Japanese history was not
immediately appreciated in Japan. In the first place, many
Japanese historians questioned the credentials of a scholar of
Japanese history who had been trained abroad. In 191, in
response to a derisive comment by a Japanese historian on his
analysis of Japanese feudalism, Asakawa wrote a spirited defense:
(1) Overseas scholars have the liberty to think freely, which
might not always be the case in Japan. (2) Overseas scholars
have advantageous opportunities to practice comparative his -
tory. () e disadvantage of scant materials can be at least
partly compensated for by intensive analysis and interpretation.
Finally, he proposed, as long as domestic scholars cooperate
with overseas scholars studying Japanese history, we can offer
treasures in Japanese history for the development of humanity.1
To be dismissed by one’s compatriots must have stung, but
Asakawa consoled himself with his motto that “Science will
always prefer the white light of truth to the red glare of a
flame.”2
After World War ii, Japanese historiography was strongly
Marxist in orientation, which provided other grounds on which
to dismiss Asakawa’s scholarship. In 1961, with support from
the Ministry of Education, Professor Nagahara Keiji3 organized
a research team to Iriki, the feudal domain that Asakawa had
studied. Nagahara had undoubtedly chosen the Iriki village
among many villages because he knew Asakawa’s works. After
conducting his own research on Iriki, Nagahara advanced a
conclusion about the oppressiveness of serfdom in medieval
Japan that was at odds with Asakawa’s thesis about the contrac-
tual nature of peasant-lord relations.4 Nagahara wrote a book5
in his last years in which he evaluated eminent historians who
had contributed to the development of Japanese history. Asa -
kawa’s name does not even appear in those pages. Many
followers of Nagahara, including liberal scholars, followed his
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lead and ignored Asakawa’s achievements. Only in recent years,
with a new generation of scholarship focusing on social and
cultural history, has Asakawa’s emphasis on peasants’ resource-
fulness become fully appreciated. Among economic historians,
Asa kawa’s interpretations of medieval land contracts have been
accepted more or less as conclusive.
Asakawa’s Citizen Diplomacy
Although Asakawa was a historian of a rather arcane subject,
he was deeply interested in public policy and international
peace. In the early twentieth century, the growing rivalry
between Russia and Japan captured his attention, not only for
the sake of Japan’s welfare, but because he feared that a
Russian/French cabal could cannibalize China and close off
much of Asia to vital trade and investment.
In August 190, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations
were deadlocked, Asakawa, then 1 years old, stayed at the
Wentworth Hotel and watched the conference as an observer.
A local newspaper, the Boston Herald, carried an interview
with Asakawa on August 24, 190 in which he was quoted as
saying that the powers owed it to the world to conclude an
early peace. He was of the view that Japan should not demand
more than was necessary to ensure its safety for the future, to
obtain full and free access for it to the markets of Manchuria,
and to secure a dominating influence over Korea. On the other
hand, Russia should not submit to any terms that would jeop-
ardize its honor or wound its dignity as a nation. “As to indem-
nity, I am unable to say whether Japan is entitled to one or not.
As I understand her terms, she does not desire to inflict any
penalty upon Russia. All she asks is the mere repayment, in
whole or in part, of the costs she has been put to by having had
to wage war.”
Asakawa’s opinions on Russo-Japan treaty negotiation were
not welcomed by the Japanese correspondents who were
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covering the negotiation process. Fukutomi Masatoshi criticized
Asakawa by his pen name, Seison, in his article, “US correspon-
dence, episode on peace talk” in a Japanese newspaper, Tokyo
Asahi Shimbun on October 0, 190.
Asakawa is a graduate from Yale University and now is
teaching oriental politics as a lecturer at some school in the
US. His name card carries “Ph.D. and Lecturer.” He won’t
speak Japanese even to Japanese people and speaks only
English to anybody. He interacts with many white people and
explains peace negotiations, staying in the Wentworth Hotel
in Portsmouth. He argues “Japan definitely does not want any
indemnity. Although abandoning money seems contrary to
Japanese public opinion, we should neglect public opinion in
the case of a grave international problem of this sort. e
Japanese government should decide according to its own
wisdom.”
(my translation)
Fukutomi went on to suggest that Asakawa could be an
agent of the Japanese government.
Otherwise, how could he stay at a high class  dollar per
night hotel? We Japanese correspondents are quite angry
with him, and would like to bring him down a few pegs.
Unfortunately, he won’t speak Japanese. We are afraid to
quarrel with him in English lest we be overheard and bring
shame on Japan’s honor.
(my translation)
Asakawa was a young lecturer at Dartmouth College at the
time, having completed a Ph.D. in history from Yale University
in 1902. His dissertation was on e Early Institutional Life of
Japan, which examined the political reforms of 64 a.d. Beyond
being a historian of medieval Japan, he was also a knowledgeable
scholar of international relations. Asakawa had published e
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Russo-Japanese Conflict; Its Causes and Issues with Houghton
Mifflin in the United States and A. Constable & Co. in Britain in
1904. His articles, “Some of the Issues of the Russo-Japanese
Conflict” and “Some of the Events Leading up to the War in the
East” appeared in the Yale Review in May and August 1904. His
motivation seemed genuinely patriotic to his home country,
Japan, but he had no relations with the Japanese government.
Asakawa could afford to stay in a luxury hotel in Portsmouth
because his accommodations were provided by William J.
Tucker, the president of Dartmouth College, who was Asakawa’s
mentor.
Another actor at Portsmouth was Sakai Tokutarō, assistant
to Baron Kaneko Kentarō who was one of the architects of the
Meiji Constitution. On February 24, 1904, Baron Kaneko left
Yokohama port with two assistants, Sakai and Suzuki, and
stayed in the United States about twenty months. eir mission
was public relations activity in the United States by order of
Marquis Itō Hirobumi, who was then president of the Privy
Council. Ito decided to dispatch Kaneko to the United States
immediately after the declaration of the war against Russia. On
October , 1904, Sakai wrote a letter to his close friend, Anson
Phelps Stokes, Secretary of Yale University, asking for help after
two naval battles at Yellow Sea on August 10 and off Ulson on
August 14.
Good news continues to come from the seat of the war,
but there is absolutely not the slightest hope for early settle-
ment. What is the feeling or sentiment among the learned
scholars in New Haven as to what terms of peace Japan
should make, etc.? What do you think about it yourself? I
should like to hear it from you sometime. We are in constant
touch with home through wire. Everything there is bright
and cheerful. After the war is over, I thoroughly believe that
Christian work in Japan will make a great stride. …6
Sakai and Stokes had been classmates at the Cambridge
eological School where they had become close friends. In
addition to their personal friendship, Sakai probably approached
Stokes because the Yale Review had carried Asakawa’s articles
on the Russo-Japan confrontation in 1904.7 Sakai and Kaneko
may have thought that Yale scholars knew about and were
interested in the Russo-Japan confrontation.
In reply to Sakai, Stokes promised to consult with two or
three Yale professors and to get back to him.8 Stokes spoke with
a professor in international law, eodore Woolsey, and an
associate professor in oriental history, Frederic W. Williams,9
asking them to submit their suggestions in writing by adding
that he had a reason to believe that any proposals they cared to
make might have an “important bearing on the result.” Woolsey
replied to Stokes on October 14 190:
Of course we cannot speak for the faculty of the University.
We only give our individual views. Moreover our points of
view are somewhat different. But our conclusions are in the
main so nearly identical that after consultation we have agreed
to formulate them as a single draft, which I beg to enclose.
We infer from circumstantial evidence that the Woolsey
and Williams memo was deeply influenced by the views of
Asakawa. When Asakawa wrote his book Russia-Japan Conflict,
Williams contributed a preface. Less is known about the
personal relationship between Asakawa and Woolsey, but there
are many citations of Asakawa’s writings in Woolsey’s lecture
notes on international relations in the Far East.10 We may
assume that both Williams and Woolsey at least were readers of
Asakawa’s analysis of the Russia-Japan conflict in the Yale
Review.
Stokes replied to his old friend Sakai within a week.11
Under the proposed terms, given in detail below, Russia
would agree to limit her Asiatic fleet, confirm China’s title to
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Manchuria, transfer the lease of Port Arthur to Japan, allow
Japan to establish “such protectorate or other control over
Korea as the two may agree upon,” and surrender to Japan all
the Russian naval vessels interned in neutral ports at the
close of hostilities. No indemnity is to be required of Russia
(though she would turn over to Japan valuable railroad prop-
erty) and there would be no cession of Siberian territory.
However, if an indemnity were demanded, Japan might be
expected to hold Vladivostok temporarily as security.12
Although this narrative suggests that Asakawa played a
crucial role in the Portsmouth treaty negotiations, his name has
all but disappeared from the diplomatic record. One reason,
apparently, is that Asakawa asked Stokes not to mention him by
name when, during the war, Harold Phelps Stokes was compiling
Stokes’s writings about Yale’s involvement in the Portsmouth
Treaty.13
Asakawa wrote to Stokes on May 16, 194:
I thank you very much for sending me the pamphlet on
the story of the Yale suggestions as to a place arrangements
between Japan and Russia made in 190. I feel honored to be
included among its recipients of the small number of copies
you printed. I have read the piece with great interest, and
profited from knowing for the first time what T.R. [eodore
Roosevelt] wrote to Germany and France at the beginning of
the war. I may have told you that I was present throughout at
the hotel at Portsmouth, where the peace conference was
being held, and after saw the envoys of both sides as well as
the chief news reporters including Cortesi, Sir Wallace, and
Dr. Morrison, that, in a later year, I met T.R. and talked with
him on a phase of the conference, and that, in Japan, I also
briefly interviewed Komura.14
Stokes replied to Asakawa on May 21, 194:
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Of course I hope you realize that the only reason I did not
refer to you by name was that you wrote me during the war
requesting that your name should not be used in connection
of the incident.15
Justice is Born from Jealousy of the Powers
roughout the Russo-Japan war, the US Secretary of State,
John Hay, appealed for the respect of China’s sovereignty and
for equal access to trade with China. e powers agreed upon
these principles, which Asakawa interpreted to mean that the
weakness of China and the mutual jealousy of the powers
became the mother of justice.16 Asakawa thought that Japan
should return the Liaodong Peninsula to China 2 years follow -
ing the  agreements.
Asakawa was hopeful that Japan would make good on its
promises to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors. In
his book on the Russo-Japanese war, Asakawa wrote:
It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which
the writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is under-
stood among the people here. A vast majority of people, not
excluding recognized writers and speakers on the East, seem
to ascribe to Japan certain territorial designs, particularly in
Korea. It is not remembered that Japan was the first country
to recognize the independence of Korea, the cause of which
also cost Japan a war with China. e present war with Russia
is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s vital
interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly
follows that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow
her to fall into the hands of another power. If Korea is really
unable to stand on her feet, the solution of the difficulty does
not, in Japan’s view, consist in possessing her, but in making
her independence real by developing her resources and recog-
nizing and strengthening her national institutions. It is in
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this work that Japan’s assistance was offered and accepted. It
would be as difficult for any impartial student not to see the
need of such assistance as to confuse it with annexation. It
would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the task as
extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse.17
We know, from Asakawa’s 1909 book, Japan’s Crisis, that he
became dismayed with the Japanese government’s failure to
respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and its
refusal to make good on its promises made in 190 to respect
Jay’s principles of open door and equal access in China. When
Asakawa wrote a letter of thanks to Stokes in May 194, he
concluded his letter with these words:
I am interested most of all in the fact that, both in the
account and the conduct of Japan then and afterward, I find,
once again, how little the unconscious habits of the mental
workings of nations are understood to one another, indeed,
how little each is aware of its own. Words and acts of each
betray … the sad limitations in both respects, … limitations
that are the root causes of national and international comedies
and tragedies throughout human history. e condition can
improve only with extreme slowness. All my studies of history
during decades have pointed to the single problem of the
process of the formation of each social mind, and of the
peculiar manner of its historical manifestations. e infinite
number of concrete facts is to me but a brush with which to
sweep away the cobweb of the student’s own mind for the
clarification of the fundamental problem.18
Written only three months before his death in August 194,
this passage captures both Asakawa’s enduring hope for peace
and understanding among nations on the one hand, and his
awareness of the domestic and international roots of war on the
other. To the end of his days, he kept his optimism and realism
in productive tension.
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A Historical Note about Asakawa’s Edited Works
After Asakawa passed away in 194, the Committee for the
Publication of Dr. Asakawa Kan’ichi’s works was organized
under the chairmanship of Matsukata Saburō on February 2,
194. e Ministry of Education promised financial support in
May, and Yale University released copyrights in June. Under
these conditions, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai) agreed to support publication.19
e Committee announced that the English section would be
preserved in its original form. But, regarding the Japanese
section, a committee extensively edited the materials. at is,
besides correcting errors based on original material, it adopted
two policies for editing; (1) it would record all existing Iriki
documents, (2) all documents would be filed under the title of
the possessor, e.g., the Iriki-in, the Terao, the Okamoto, the
Tōgō, the Ketō-in, the Tsuruda, the Taki, and so on. Most casual
readers might believe that these policies created no problems.
Indeed nobody had raised concerns until 200, when I discov-
ered the faults. In fact, the two policies should be understood as
an alteration of the original work and the creation of a new
version. e first document that Asakawa selected was the
Order of the head of Go-dai in, 1135. e last documents were
(A) the Memorandum of the Shōgun’s council, 1867; and (B) the
shogun’s memorial to the throne, 1867. Regarding these last two
documents, Asakawa noted that “the editor regrets that he
decided to include (A) and (B) in the present No. too late to
enable him to add their original texts to the Japanese section of
this volume.”20 e Japanese section had already been printed
in Tokyo in 192. erefore Asakawa could not add the two
Japanese texts, when he completed the English section in 1929.
Asakawa regretted this because the last Shōgun’s memoranda
are the very symbols of the end of feudal Japan. e joint letter
of four daimyōs’ proposing voluntarily to yield their hereditary
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domains to the imperial government is not sufficient to end the
feudal regime in Japan.
us, it was certainly Asakawa’s intention that the enlarged
Tokyo version should at least include the Shōgun’s two memo-
randa. Although the volumes of the new edition comprise 2.4
times more pages than the original Yale version, they do not
include the above mentioned two short memoranda by the last
Shōgun. Another defect of the new edition is the order of
arrangement of the documents. First we should check Asakawa’s
method. e reason Asakawa put the Order of the head of Go-
dai in, 1135 on the first page is very clear: the key-word Iriki
appeared for the first time in all the documents of Japanese
history. erefore he put it in the first place. e Documents of
Iriki must start from this document, which contains the name
of Iriki. en what should be placed in the last position?
Asakawa put the four daimyōs’ joint letter in the Japanese
section of the original Yale edition. But as soon as he found the
last Shōgun’s two memoranda, he immediately translated, added
footnotes, and placed them in the last place of the English
section. From the Godai in document to the last Shōgun’s
memoranda, he arranged the documents in chronological order,
so we can read them as the development of feudalism. But the
new enlarged Tokyo edition is not in chronological order.
Rather, it is arranged according to the original possessors, so
readers cannot read it like a story, but only use it as a source
book. us Asakawa’s original intention was severely distorted.
e mem bers of the editing group probably had not read the
original English version, so they could not even recognize their
own mistakes. e enlarged Tokyo version carried three articles
by professors of the Historiographical Institute at the University
of Tokyo, Professors T. Nishioka, K. Hōgetsu, and R. Takeuchi.21
Unfortunately they did not mention even a few words about the
contents of the Documents of Iriki. ey had not yet read the
book. Nor had the members of the committee. After the
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enlarged Tokyo version appeared in 19, some people began to
read the Japanese section. However, no reader opened Asakawa’s
English notes, which Asakawa had regarded as the substance of
the book, as he stated in his Japanese preface. His “substance”
was almost completely neglected until the notes were translated
into Japanese in 200.
At long last, Asakawa’s work has enjoyed resurgent interest
in recent years for at least two reasons. e rise of China as a
massive power in Asia underscores Asakawa’s recognition of
the importance of diplomacy in maintaining peace in Asia. His
work on economic history, too, has stood the test of time,
outliving faddish detours into ideologically driven theory that
held up Japanese academe for years. It is bittersweet that
Asakawa is finally getting the visibility and recognition that he
always deserved, and that would have served his countrymen so
well in his own time.
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and the World Economy

In the 90s and 980s, Japan earned
themoniker “reactive state” for theway inwhich its foreign
economicpolicytendedtomovemostlyinresponsetostrong
foreignpressurefromtheUnitedStates,knowninternationally
by the Japanese termgaiatsu (Calder 988). Japaneseofficials
showed few signs that they recognized that capital and trade
liberalization,deregulation,andothereconomicreformsurged
by theUnitedStatesmight actuallybenefit the country.ey
were seemingly blind to the fact that the postwar process of
tradeliberalizationhadplayedsuchacriticalroleinfostering
Japan’s own economic success. Japan did remove trade and
investment barriers during thesedecades, reducing tariffs on
many goods and eliminating quotas on beef and oranges. It
seemedtoadoptthesepolicies,however,onlywhenfacedwith
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Although the fact that Japanbegan taking these initiatives at
thesametimeitwassaying“no”totheUnitedStatessuggests







Before proceeding, letme clarifywhat Imean by Japan’s
emergingeconomicliberalism.Iamnot sayingthatJapanhas
completely liberalized its economy and is on an uncontested
path toward free trade. I am saying that Japan’s elite—its
economicbureaucrats,leadingopinion-makers,andsomeofits
politicians—have shifted their beliefs about which economic
policiesare likely toproduce thebestperformance for Japan.
Fifteenyearsago,eveninthefirstseveralyearsafterthecollapse
ofthebubble,thebroadconsensuswasthatJapan’ssystemof
“convoy capitalism” (lifetime employment; the main bank
system;keiretsu businessgroups;andregulationandmanage-







Today, incontrast, theconventionalwisdom in Japanhas
turnedagainst theold Japanesemodel,as is suggestedby the
following passage from the 996 report of the Deregulation
 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be found in dozens of advisory council and business group
reports published since the mid-990s (Dore 999), clearly
rejects the idea that the best way for Japan to maximize its
economicwelfareisthroughgovernmentregulationandprotec-
tion of existing domestic producers. Instead, what Japanese
government and other economic elites in recent years have
been repeatingover andover is that Japanneeds to embrace
domesticandinternationalrules-based market competition asa
meansofrestoringeconomicgrowthandcompetitiveness.




the rejection of the idea that convoy capitalism represents a
superiormodel for Japan isstartingtoproducedomesticand
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has become the new orthodoxy in Japan, I argue, through a
processofelitelearningthatcanbetracedbacktotheearlier





goesonwithindomestic society.Legro (000a), for example,
describes how the process of social learning requires that a
























the learning process—Japanwould not likely be shifting to a
newliberalorthodoxyifithadnotexperienceditslongestand
deepest recession of the postwar period—he unnecessarily
restricts our focus to the process going on within domestic
society.Extensiveresearchinsocialpsychologyinformsusthat
individuallearningdoesnothappenmerelythroughindividuals’






Japan’s emergingeconomic liberalismhasbeen influencedby
Japaneseelites’ interactionswithAmericaneconomicofficials











pation years, but they had stuck stubbornly to the Japanese
model.Nevertheless,evenasyearsofhectoringbytheUnited
Statestradenegotiatorsprovokedtradeofficialsandpoliticians
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toofferheateddefensesofJapanesepolicies,theyexposedthem




turned sour in the 990s, Japanese officials hadplenty of old
“classnotes”toconsultastheysoughttodiagnosetheproblem.
islearningprocesswashelpedalongbyhowJapaneseofficials
themselvesused liberal languageand ideas, atfirst forpurely
defensivereasonsaimedatcounteringAmericantradepressure,
andby theirdefensiveembraceofwto and theOrganization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) multi-
lateralism.
e Reactive State Pattern
When Japan gained admission to theGeneralAgreement on
Tariffs and Trade (gatt) in 9 and the oecd in 964, it
assumedavarietyofobligationsrequiringittoremove,reduce,
or reconfigure barriers to trade and foreign investment. Its
admissiontotheoecd obligedJapantoeliminaterestrictions
on foreigndirect investment,whereundergatt rules, Japan
was, inprinciple,expectedtoreplacequantitativerestrictions
ontrade,whichwereparticularlynumerousintheagricultural
sector, with tariffs. ese rules were based on neoclassical
economicideasabouthowcompetition,includinginternational
competitionfosteredbyforeigninvestmentandtrade,improves
economic efficiency, enhances productivity, and propels eco-
nomicgrowth.ereisnoevidence,however,thattheJapanese
wholedthenationintotheseorganizationsdidsobecausethey
shared these ideas. On the contrary, the extended period of
mostlybilateralnegotiations required to force Japan, through
the use of threats and deadlines, to comply with these basic
obligationsof itsmembership ingatt,andtheoecd helped
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pattern for a long series of market-opening negotiations,
stretching from the 90s into the 980s. Japan also resisted
UnitedStatespressuretoimproveaccesstomarketsforAmer-
ican semiconductors, auto parts, satellites, supercomputers,
construction, flat glass, paper, wood products, retail stores,
financial services, telecommunications equipment, medical
products,tobacco,andlawyers.Ineachofthesecases,negotia-
tionsfollowedasetpattern(Campbell99).eUnitedStates
would raise objections, usually beginning in lateMarch of a
givenyearwhentheOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentativewas
required to list outstanding foreign trade barriers. It would
initiate an investigation under US trade law that set specific
deadlinesayearorsointhefutureandinviteJapantoparticipate
inbilateraltalksaimedat“resolving”thedispute.eJapanese
side would initially deny that there was any problem and
grumble aboutAmerican unilateralism, but always agreed to
talk(atleastuntilthemid-990s).
Intheearlymonthsofthesetalks,Japaneseofficialswould
insist that the difficulties US producers had expanding their
JapanesemarketsharewasnotduetoJapanesebarriersbuttoa
lackofeffortontheirpart.eywouldalsoexplainwhychange
was impossible. United States officials, meanwhile, would
muster statistical evidence showing howUS firms hadmuch
largermarketsharesinneutralmarketsthaninJapanandwarn
theJapaneseabouthowCongresswaslikelyto“goprotectionist”
unless barriers were removed. ey would also add some
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concessions to allow US officials to declare that they were
satisfied.
Japaneseliberalizationinthesecaseswasalwaysgrudging,
offeringnomore than theminimumpolicy change to satisfy
American negotiators, often at the very last minute. When
announcingtradedeals,Japaneseofficialsrarelyevenpretended
thatJapanmightactuallybenefitfromtheagreedpolicychanges.
ey listened to the lectures from the Americans about the











and to retain the American security guarantee (Calder 988;
Mikanagi996).








industriescoordinate investment, throughcartels and regula-
tions,tospeedthepaceatwhichtheydevelopedscaleeconomies
and technological capabilities. Japanese industrial policy was
long based on these List-inspired ideas. Given Japan’s back-
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wardness,thestateneededtostepintolimit“excessivecompe-
tition,” regulate market entry, and coordinate investment so
that industrycoulddevelop theeconomiesof scaleand tech-
nologyneededtocompetewithlargerandmoretechnologically
advancedforeignfirms(Johnson98).Notsurprisingly,given
the predominance of these views, few Japanese elites in the








noted above, however, the United States rejected this set of
ideasafterthedisasteroftheGreatDepressionandWorldWar
ii, embracing in its place (embedded) liberal ideas closer to
thoseofSmithandRicardo(Ruggie98;Goldstein99).
InJapan,too,thelearningprocessowedagreatdealtothe
nation’s experience of its “Great Recession” in the 990s, but
learning began in 980s when the nation’s economy was still





to avoid a teacher’s ire is to tell her what she wants to hear.
Reaganadministrationofficials,manyofwhomwereneoliberal
ideologues, were particularly prone to lecture Japanese about
thevirtuesoffreemarkets.PrimeMinisterNakasoneYasuhiro
was toyingwith thisphilosophyhimselfwithhisemphasison
budget-cutting “administrative reform” (Ohtake 994).He de-
cidedthatonewaytogettheAmericansoffhisbackwouldbeto
organize a blue ribbon commission that would produce a




staffed the groupwith reformist,market-oriented economists
andintellectuals,knowingtheywouldproposeareformvision
that would please American critics of Japanese trade policy.
athisaudiencewasprimarilyforeignisalsosuggestedbyhis
decision to request that the commission complete its reports
justintimetodeliverthemduring“Ron-Yasu”summitmeetings.
ereportswere indeedamarkeddeparture fromearlier
economic policy reports. Calling for “policies based upon
market mechanisms,” the Maekawa Commission urged the
government to promote deregulation based on the idea that
thereshouldbe“freedominprinciple,restrictionsonlyasexcep-
tions.”Rather thanrelyingon increasedexports topropel the
economyforward, iturged,thegovernmentshould“strivefor















Japanese reformers involved in their preparation referred to
them to back up their arguments, and US officials brought
themupduringsubsequentbilateraltalks,especiallyduringthe
80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Structural Impediments Initiative between 989 and 99
(Armacost996;Schoppa99).
Although the Maekawa Commission and the stubborn
recessionoftheearly990shadmadeliberalideasabouttrade
andcompetitionmorelegitimatewithinJapanbythetimethe













accept targetsduringhisspring99visit toWashington, the
primeminister and officials travelingwith him spoke from a
well-coordinatedscript.vieswouldrequiretheJapanesegovern-











Although this Japanese attempt to hide behind the “free
trade”bannerwasagainmostlyapublicrelationsexercise,the












commission on the earlier Maekawa Commission, inviting
Hiraiwa Gaishi, head of Keidanren, to head the panel and
bringingonboardreformisteconomistssuchasNakataniIwao.
eHiraiwaCommissionreportagainfeaturedliberalideas
about how Japan needed deregulation, market-opening, and
competitiontopropelitsrecoveryfromthepost-bubblereces-
sion(NakataniandOhta994).istime,however,thecommis-





of annual deregulation white papers—recommendations that
werealladoptedbytheHosokawacabinetintheearlymonths
of994(Carlile998).Byinstitutionalizingitsideasinthisway,






focus on the immediate results misses, however, the longer-
term consequences of Japan’s decision to trumpet liberal
8 LeonardJ.Schoppa
rhetoricandideasinreportssuchasthese.Withinmonthsof
the Hiraiwa Commission’s adjournment, one of its leading
members,Nakatani,was loudly bemoaning the failure of the
commissiontoliveuptoitsrhetoric(NakataniandOhta998).
Afewyearslater,TakenakaHeizō,anotherreformisteconomist
whoplayed a leading role on theEconomic StrategyCouncil












everywhere one looked one saw government reports, best-
sellingbooks,andtelevisioncommentatorscriticizingregula-
tions and trade protection for stifling economic growth and
touting rule-basedmarket competition as the tonic for what
ailed the nation. Not just Nakatani and Takenaka, but other
reform economists and intellectuals, such as Sakaiya Taichi
(999), KatōKan (99), andNoguchi Yukio (99), allwrote
hot-sellingbooksfeaturedincascadingdisplaysinTokyo’sbook-
storewindows.
Meanwhile the government continued to churn out eco-
nomicpolicyreports,bythistimeindependentoftheUS-Japan
negotiating calendar, urging Japan to embrace competition,
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reportswasmotivatedbyadesiretogivetheAmericanssome
prettyprosetodistractthemfrombilateraltradedemands.As
the panels deliberated in 998 and 999,US-Japan economic
relations were as relaxed as they had been in many years.
Obuchiconvenedthepanelssimplytoprovidethegovernment
with blue prints for the future thatwould guide Japan’s own
effortstorestoretheeconomytohealthasitenteredthenew
century.
efirst panel, organized immediately afterObuchi took
office,washeadedbybusinessmanHiguchiHirotarō.Itwasthe
EconomicStrategyCouncil,chargedwiththeurgentandimme-
diate task of recommending how Japan could right-end an
economythatwasonthebrinkofafinancialcrisisandsuffering
from deflationary tendencies. e panel’s recommendations
again emphasized competition. It blamed Japan’s economic
problemsontheprevalenceof“moralhazard”situations“where
consequencesdonotchangeregardlessofwhetherpeopletry














their own initiative, creating a dynamic public space.e



























over photographic film, Japan again insisted that all such
disputes needed to be referred to the wto. More recently,
Japan stepped forward during the lead-up to the new Doha
Roundasaleadingadvocateofwto reformsdesignedtoend
abusesofanti-dumpingremedies.
Japan’s embrace of multilateralism in the 990s certainly
contrastedwithitsslowcompliancewithgatt andoecd rules
inthe960sand90sandsuggestedthatthenation“hadseen







targeting Japan under US trade law, Japanese officials began
consideringhowbest tocounter the intolerable trend toward
escalatingdemands.Ataboutthesametime,gatt signatories
were considering ways to improve the organization’s dispute
settlementmechanism.Japaneseofficialsquicklyrealizedthat
proposedreforms,whichafteradoptioneliminatedtheability
of losing parties to veto dispute panel rulings and reduced
opportunities for delay, provided anothermeans for them to
deflect bilateral demands.Because theUnited States toowas





















most interesting consequenceswas the effect of this strategy
shiftonJapaneseofficialssenttostafftheseinternationalorgan-
izations and negotiate under their jurisdiction.Whereas the
mostpromisingyoungofficialsintheMinistryofForeignAffairs
(mofa) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(meti) had, in the past, been routed through key positions
dealingwith the bilateral relations since the late 980s, these
ministrieshavepromotedtothemostseniorpositionsofficials
with extensive experience inmultilateral economic organiza-




ment reports, this strategyhad ideational consequences. It is
well known that international organizations like the Inter-
nationalMonetaryFund(imf),wto,andoecd shareanorga-
nizational culture that emphasizes neoclassical economics.
ough JohnWilliamson (990) was referring mostly to the
Washington-based international organizations (the imf and




trained in the United States even if they are not American
themselves.epoliciestheyrecommendincludeprivatization
of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, and labor market
reforms.Bysendingfast-trackyoungofficialstoserveinthese
institutionsforperiodsoftwoormoreyears,thegovernment
assumed the risk that theymight absorb someof these ideas
thatweresocontradictorytothepre-990conventionalwisdom
inTokyo.




assist in the preparation of the OECD Review of Regulatory
Reform in Japan,publishedin999.Overanextendedperiod,







titledRegulatory Reform: Competition and Cooperation (998),
emphasizingJapan’sneedtoharnesscompetitivemarketforces
inordertodealwithitseconomicproblems.Afterhereturned









officials, have helped further consolidate the ideational shift
towardtheacceptanceofneoclassicalviewsoneconomiccauses
and effects within the Japanese government. My experience
talking with economic bureaucrats over the past ten years
suggeststhatmostoftheunder-4generation,aswellasmany
of those above this level, now accept the view that market
competition,facilitatedbyampleinternationaltradeandinvest-
ment, is required tomakemature economies such as Japan’s




governmentofficials—not just inmeti andmofa butalso in
mof.
e Consequences of Ideational Change
Changes in economic ideas, of course, do not in themselves
constitutechangesinpolicy.oughJapanesebureaucratsand
otherelitesnowaccepttheideathatcoddlingincumbentfirms
through regulation and trade protection imposes costs on















e predominance of liberal economic ideas in Japan today







policycanbe seenatwork in theexampleofPrimeMinister
HashimotoRyutaro’sBigBangreforms.Announcedinthefall







agenda—all of which involved introducingmore competitive
marketforcesintofinancialmarkets.Justadecadeearlier,when
themof hadbeenpressuredtoliberalizefinancialmarkets, it
had done so in ways that actually increased officials’ discre-
tionarypowerbycreating“morerules”(Vogel996).istime,





theatcher years,with thefinalmeasuresnot implemented
until00,thepackageliveduptothispromise.Firmspreviously
operating in segmentedmarkets for various banking services





eliminated, allowing capital to flow across borders with no
restrictions. e government guarantee that had previously
promised no bank would be allowed to fail was removed
(Laurence00).esereformshavealreadyhadamajorimpact
on this area of business, with foreign firms playing a much
largerrole inawiderrangeoffinancialservicesandJapanese























than Hashimoto’s Big Bang. He could have emphasized in-
creasedspendingonunemploymentinsuranceandothermeas-
uresofthistype,designedtoreassurevotersnervousaboutthe
economy’s continued poor performance, but instead he, too,
focusedonasetofreformsthatwere largelybasedon liberal
economic principles. His slogan, “structural reform without
sanctuaries,”toldvotershewantedtohelpacceleratethepace





e specific reforms he stressed, too, were liberal ideas,
includingafreezeongovernmentdebtissuanceandtheprivati-
zation of public corporations—including Japan Highway, the
Japan Housing Finance Agency, and the mail, banking, and
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insuranceservicesprovidedbythepostalservice.Koizumihad
a decidedlymixed record in his efforts to push forward this
liberalreformagenda(Schoppa006).Hisattempttorestruc-
tureJapanHighwayinawaythatwouldconstrainitsabilityto




secondarymarkets, like FannieMae. Koizumi’smost famous
achievement—the privatization of Japan Post, secured by
expellingrebelldp Dietmembersfromthepartyandcallingan
earlyelectionin00—isnotasclearavictoryforliberalreform
as was advertised at the time. To secure the passage of this
legislation,Koizumiwasforcedtoacceptanumberofcompro-
mises thathave limited theentryofnewcompetitors inmail
servicesandhavedraggedouttheprocessofprivatizingpostal
financial services to such a degree that it remains unclear
whethertherestructuredJapanPostwillbeginrechannelingits
massive financial assets away from the traditionally favored,
government-affiliatedclients(Maclachlan,006).Mypointhere
isnotthatliberaleconomicideashavetriumphedoveralloppo-
sition,but that they set the agenda in suchaway thatpolicy
change since 000 has moved mostly in a liberal direction
wheneverpoliticalenergyhascreatedanopening.






pore, Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and additional
bilateral deals are in theworks.And these bilateral deals are
now being supplemented by regional deals, starting with a
recently-signedfta linkingJapanandAssociationofSoutheast
9LeonardJ.Schoppa
Asian Nations (asean), that may lead eventually to wider
regional agreements includingChina,Korea, India,Australia,
NewZealand,andmaybeeventheUnitedStates.4 eseagree-



















Of course, Japan’s regional trade policy continues to be






















domesticcompetitionfor its own sake.Whereasrecentinitiatives
have been “home-grown,” however, the process of ideational
changethathashelpedproducethemwasinparttheproduct
ofJapan’searlierinteractionswiththeUnitedStates.Itsefforts
to deflect gaiatsu by setting up liberal advisory councils and
usingliberalrhetoricendeduplegitimizingtheseviews,espe-
ciallyafterJapan’seconomyentereditsdecade-longslump.At









described here is best explained by the economic difficulties
thatconfrontedJapanduringthe990s?Americantradepres-
sure and related interactions among American and Japanese
economic elites were not necessary to bring about the shift
becauseitwasboundtohappeninviewoftheeconomicdiffi-






















alternative to the Japanesemodel,purelydueto itseconomic
difficulties.ebestwecandoistoconsideracounterfactual.




consumption. If Japanhadbeenheavilyengaged ineconomic
negotiations with Europe during these years, isn’t it possible
that the European welfare state might have emerged as the
orthodoxanswertoJapan’seconomicworries?





byportraying themselvesaschampionsof free trade;and the
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nationsentitsbrightestyoungofficialstoparticipateinmulti-
lateral economic institutions. It should not surprise us that
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mechanisms through which individual institutional reforms
suchasthismightleadtomeaningfulchangeinJapan’spolitical





during this time. e Bank has not achieved the monetary
policyorpoliticalstabilityoutcomesthatdominanttheoretical
argumentsaboutcentralbankindependencepredict.atthe







tutional interests, new distributions of political and infor-
mational advantages, and the persistence of central bank

Bank of Japan Independence at Ten Years:
Searching for Mechanisms of Change
Jennifer Holt Dwyer
6
independence as the internationally recognized marker of
qualitycentralbanking.











well-known political economy characteristics we all dutifully
learnedasdefiningwhat isuniqueaboutJapan,willevergive
way to something we would recognize as fundamentally dif-
ferent. If thismore radical redirection of a national political
economy is possible, then it behooves us to search for the
mechanisms through which this transformation takes place.
Althoughonlyonecase,thisstudyofcentralbankreformillus-
trates how even a single reform can lead to change in the
broader political economy over time as actors’ interests, as
definedbytheirorganizationaffiliations,changeandinforma-
tionflowsadjust tonew institutionalpatterns,bothofwhich
contribute to new politics. In this way our understanding of
howthepolicyofcentralbankreformmayhave transformed
politicsovertimeshouldshedlightontheextenttowhichthe
99s decade of reform may eventually lead to what we all
recognizeasquitedifferentpoliticaleconomy.
estudybeginswithaverybrief reviewofhowtheboj









After briefly identifying some of the domestic and interna-
tionaldevelopmentsthatundoubtedlyaddedtothedifficulties
forthenewlyindependentboj,thechapterexploressomeof
the circumstances that have supported the continuation of
boj independence over this period despite the abovemen-
tioneddifficulties.Taken together, these sectionsemphasize
that, even thoughmost lawmakers who supported the new
lawmaynothaveintendedtosignificantlyalterthedistribution
ofeconomicpolicymakingpowerinJapan,thenewboj law,in
combination with other reforms adopted at the same time,
may have a more lasting impact than many expected. The
finalsectiondiscussespredictionsforthenear-termfutureof
theboj independence.
e New Bank of Japan Law: 
e Unexpected Child of Domestic Political Uncertainty
eburstingoftheassetbubbleeconomyinJapanin99left
in its wake disruptions in both the economic and political
arenas.1 In99,forthefirsttimein8years,therulingLiberal
Democratic Party (ldp) lost its longstanding position as the
rulingparty in Japan’sDiet.Althoughtheldp’sabsence from
government was short lived, and they came back to power
withinayearaspartofacoalitiongovernment,by996,when
most of the debates about reforming the central bank took
place,Japanwasbeinggovernedbyitsfifthprimeministerin
three years. Further complicating the calculations of Japan’s




Bank of Japan Independence at Ten Years
ofpoliticalpartiesandcoalitiongovernmentsduringthisthree
yearperiod.2
ese developments encouraged politicians from many
partiestosearchforsomethingtoturntheelectoraltideintheir








explicitly reform-oriented newer parties. For their part, the
otherparties,aswellasthegeneralpopulation,placedmostof
theblame for Japan’splightonwhatwasviewedas theldp’s
poor oversight of excessively powerful Ministry of Finance
(mof) bureaucrats. It was under these circumstances that
granting the Bank of Japan greater independence became an
attractiveelectoraltacticforboththeldp andtheopposition.



















agenda in Japan primarily because of the domestic political
circumstancesdescribedabove;neithermultilateralagreements
nor gaiatusu played any role. Nevertheless, the process was
significantly influenced by international financialmarket and
ideationaltrends.First,bythemid-99s,Japanwaslosingits
competitiveness as an international financial center, and this
development concerned those who were considering central
bankreform.Specifically,foreignfinancialfirmsthathadrushed
into Japan in the98s to takeadvantageofabundantcapital
andskyrocketingstockandrealestatemarketsbeganrelocating
businesses tootherpartsofAsia.Although foreignfirmsdid
not represent a large share of the domesticmarket, they did
bring asset and liability management skills, secondary debt
market experience from the US savings and loanmeltdown,
and other types of financial expertise that Japanese financial
firms and financial market regulators increasingly sought as
Japan’sfinancialsectorproblemsincreased.Ontheotherhand,
and somewhat ironically, the percentage of Japanese shares
owned by foreigners rose to a new peak in 996, and these
foreignshareholderswereamongthemostactivetraders.Asa
result, thepotential impactof foreignparticipation in Japan’s
financialmarkets, or lack thereof, was greater than a simple
measure of foreigner-ownedmarket share would suggest. At
the international level, thedecliningcompetitivenessof Japan
asafinancialcenterwasevidentwhenJapanesefinancialinsti-
tutionsandsomefirmsweredowngradedbycredit-ratingagen-
cies, and Japanese banks were charged a significant “Japan
premium”toborrowinoverseasmarkets.Astheyearspassed,
Japanesefirmsthathadoncedominatedtheinternationalleague
tables began dropping down the lists. Taken together, these
developmentscreatedgreaterawarenessinJapanofthepotential








A secondway that the international environment shaped
centralbankreforminJapanwasbypresentingaclearinterna-
tionallyembracedstandardofwhataqualitycentralbankshould
look like. In the99s, thevirtualconsensus,embracedmost
ardently by financialmarket participants and themedia,was
that a central bank shouldbe legally independent.3 Although
theemergenceofindependenceastheinternationalmarkerfor
quality central banking did not cause central bank reform in
Japan,oncepoliticianshaddecidedtopursuereform,alldebates
were circumscribedby the anticipatedmarket incentives and
credibility-enhancing benefits of adopting an internationally
acceptedstandard.Japan’slawmakers,whoweretryingtorestore




the existence of a clear international norm forced thosewho
were opposed to central bank reform to fight an intellectual
battle that extended far beyond a narrow discussion of the
appropriatenessofthesequalitiesforJapan’scentralbank.
Efforts to approximate international best practices and
increase the attractiveness of Japan’s financial markets were
central to the boj reform process.4 Official and scholarly
accountsofdeliberationssuggestthesame.5 eCentralBank
Study Group (cbsg) Secretariat outlined the groups’ funda-
mentalthinkingas“inthisageofadvancingglobalizationand




ingly, the boj’s statement on thecbsg report concludes that
the new lawmust be consistentwith the concepts and ideas
foundinrecentcentralbankreformsinothermajordeveloped
countries, and that these standards should be aggressively
pursued togaingreaterpublic andmarket credibility.7 In the
end,Japan’slawmakersagreed.
An examination of the impact of international financial
marketsandideationaltrendsonthenewlawhighlightsthree
interestinganomalies.First,onecanseethedisjuncturebetween
political rhetoric and policy choice. boj reform arose out of
politicians’effortstogainelectoraladvantagebyatleastrhetor-
ically reasserting their control over economic policymaking
anddoingsospecificallybyreducingtheinfluenceofthemof
bureaucrats throughboj reform.Yet,much to thechagrinof
somepoliticiansafterthefact,theydidnotpasslegislationto
makethecentralbankdirectlyresponsivetotheDiet.Instead,
they granted the bank legal independence, which effectively
reducedtheirinfluenceovermonetarypolicyaswell.Second,
this adoption of an international standard is noteworthy be-










within even large, advanced, industrial economies, including
one with a history of implementing reform in a distinctly
“Japaneseway.”
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ment (oecd) countries. It proposes that central bank inde-
pendence enables a government to credibly commit not to
stimulategrowthintheshorttermthroughsurprisemonetary
shocks,whichcancausehigherinflationinthelongerterm.9 In
short, central bank independence is considered desirable
because it creates low and stable inflation rates, and these
provide the best foundation on which to promote sustained
growth.Sincelowinflationbenefitsgrowth,andgrowthbenefits
governments, governments are increasingly choosing central
bank independence. In this literature, before the 99s Japan




Given thisbroad expectationof the economicbenefitsof
centralbankindependence,oneseeminglystraightforwardway
to assess the boj’s performance since 998 is to askwhether










the new boj law took effect, and continues through today.12
issituationhasleftJapanwithashrinkingeconomy,increased
the real debtburden inmany cases, and strained themacro-
economy.13 Giventheuniquenessofdeflationinthepost-wwii
period,however,therewas,foralongtime,virtuallynoschol-
arshiporexperience for theboj todrawon in itseffortsand
thusnoexpectationsregardingcentralbankindependenceand
deflationspecifically.14
Speaking less literally,however,whetherone judges inde-
pendence as having resulted in a “better” monetary policy
dependslargelyonone’sviewonwhatacentralbankshoulddo
tohaltdeflation. Ifoneaccepts theargumentthat thecentral
bank’szerointerestratepolicy,andlateritsquantitativeeasing
andgovernmentbondpurchases,areallabankcando,because




byquitea largenumberofnon-boj economists that inflation
targeting,purchasesofalternativeassets,orothernon-conven-
tionalmeansoffurthereasingareabsolutelynecessarytoend
deflation, then theboj’s independence, expressed through its
opposition to these policies, certainly seems to have made
thingsworse.16
Althoughthedebatesoverwhattheboj didthatwasright
orwrong are extensive and beyondwhat I can address here,
suffice it to say, theboj cameunderunprecedentedcriticism
throughoutthisentiretenyearperiod.Fromtheverybeginning
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tions, because it is doubtful that independence would have
significantly improvedmonetary policy under normal condi-
tionseither.isisinpartbecause,asexplainedabove,theboj
hadsuccessfullymanagedinflationformanyyearsasadepend-
ent bank, a record e Economist described as “second to
none.”18 Moreover, the evidenceconcerningpoliticalbusiness
cyclesstronglysuggeststhatthecyclesthatassociateelections
witheconomicexpansioninJapanoccurrednotbecausepoliti-
cians stimulated monetary policy prior to elections, which
wouldjustifyindependence,butratherbecausepoliticianswere
opportunisticandcalledelectionswhentheeconomywasdoing






In short, the broad political economy context in Japan was
alreadysupportingalowinflationpolicy,socentralbankreform
wasnotnecessaryforlowinflationandgrowth.
If central bank independence did not produce clear eco-
nomicbenefits,diditatleastproducetheanticipatedpolitical
ones?Oneprominentargumentproposesthatasliberalization














policy than at any other time in the post-wwii period. As
suggestedabove,debatesbyeconomistsoverthebestmonetary
policyinadeflationaryenvironmentseeminglyappearinevery
newspaper and on every channel.Moreover, these positions
are mirrored in disagreements among reformist and more
traditionalpoliticiansoverhowmuchtheboj canbeexpected
to do without more structural reform in other parts of the
economy.22
Inpart,thispoliticizationwasencouragedbythelawitself.
To improve transparency,Article 54 of the new law requires
thattheboj governorreporttotheDiettwiceayear.However,
asonecentralbankofficialdescribedit,fortheboj governor,
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thenewlawrequiresjumpingfromthefryingpanrightintothe
fire.23 During his five years in office, Governor Hayami was
calledtoappearbeforetheDietorapoliticalcommitteemore











cianshavebecome so frustratedwith thenewly independent
boj thattheyhaveproposedamendingthenewBankofJapan
Lawtorequiremoreaccommodationofgovernmentplans in
general, or to include an inflation-targeting requirement in
particular.25 Not surprisingly, when PrimeMinister Koizumi
Jun’ichiro was considering whom to choose as governor to
replaceHayamiinMarch,politiciansinthiscampwanted
himtoconsideronlycandidateswhowouldcommittoadopta
more expansionary policy. Because Governor Fukui’s 5-year
termexpiredinMarchof8,theJapanesepressisabuzzwith
reports that politicians are considering demanding inflation-
targeting credentials or some similar commitment from the
nextboj Governor.
ecriticismofboj monetarypolicydoesnotcomeonly
from politicians. Bureaucrats in the mof and the Financial






should be in its efforts to close down failing banks, require
disclosure, and force consolidation of the banking industry.
Moreover,bothformer-GovernorHayamiandGovernorFukui
Toshihiko have had occasion to remind bureaucrats and the
public that no one will be allowed to interfere in monetary
policydiscussions.Cross-institution criticismwasnot absent
inthepast,butboththesheerquantityandharshqualityofthis
mutualfingerpointing increasedsignificantlyafter 998, sug-
gestingthatpriortoindependencesomeofthesedisagreements
would have been handled behind closed doors andmanaged
largelybythemof.
Finally,thisincreasedpoliticizationisinpartaresultofthe






are nowmore necessary because there is as yet no effective
directorofnationaleconomicpolicymakingtoreplacethecoor-




of economic policymaking clearly in the hands of the prime




associatedwith a particularministrywould be better able to
consider the broad national interest. us far, however, the
effectiveness of this new organization structure is unclear.
TakenakaHeizo,whoheldthepositionoftheMinisterofState
for Economic and Fiscal Policy for most of this period, was
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considered,foratleastthefirstpartofhistenure,nottohave
the political connections necessary to control the economic
agenda.Hewasrepeatedly forcedtostepbackfromorrevise
his proposals. Although there is not yet enough research to
determinetheeffectivenessofcefp,itisonlylogicalthatifthe
cabinetofficedoesnotprovideeffectivecoordination,officials




reduced overt conflict aboutmonetary policy. However, it is
possiblethatthecriticismheapedontheboj issomewhatmore
showthansubstance.atis,oncemonetarypolicywashanded
over to the boj, politicians, bureaucrats, and possibly even
cabinet members concluded that they could enhance their
standingamongrelevantconstituentsiftheycriticizedtheboj.
atiseasiertodoiftheydonothaveauthorityorresponsibility
for achieving those outcomes. In other words, central bank




does notmake sense according to the twomodels of central
bankindependencereviewedabove.Itdoesmakesenseifthe
motivationforthenewboj lawwerenotrootedinapreference
among politicians for central bank independence per se, but
ratherinadesiretoredirectpublicangerandsurviveelections
byofferingavoter-targetedexpressionoftheir“commitment”
to tackle Japan’s tough problems, if only the (unreasonable)
independentboj wouldletthem.
4 JenniferHoltDwyer
Why Has the Road Been So Rocky 
for the Independent Bank of Japan?
Whenrecognizingthecriticismoftheboj,onemustalsokeep
in mind the nearly unbelievable challenges the newly inde-
pendentboj hasfaced.esechallengesaresummarizedbelow
asthoserelatedtoinstitutionalreorganizationandthoserelated
to economic interdependence. During this ten year period,
Japan has been buffeted by a large number of political and
economicdifficulties.Andvirtuallyeveryoneofthemhasmade
lifedifficultfortheboj aswell.




reform. Most relevant for this study, the institutional actors
charged with economic policymaking changed significantly.














tionalorder, it isnot surprising thatmonetarypolicydidnot
alwaysdevelopsmoothly.
Second,theeconomyinJapanandbeyondhasexperienced
tremendous turmoil. In addition to the stockmarket decline
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andnonperformingloans,Japanexperienceditsfirstbankfail-










low-inflation growth trajectory. In short, we should show a
littlemercy for thebank. Itsfirst ten yearshavebeenby any
measureextremelychallenging.




as a central economic policymaking actor over time. ree
variables leadme to thisconclusion: thecodificationof inde-
pendence in law; the impact of new institutional forms on
actors’ interests and power resources; and the persistence of







justified,unmaking the laworotherwise reducing legal inde-
pendencewouldrequireanawkwardpublicretractionofthese







jurisdiction.When others have criticized the boj’smonetary






nized. As Carey notes, “e act of writing down rules can
contributetotheirbindingforce.”29
In addition, revoking independence would require law-
makers to agree onmonetary policy thereafter,whichwould
notbeeasyunderthepoliticalandeconomiccircumstancesin
which Japan finds itself in today.With Japan’s currently split
Dietunabletoagreeonmuchofanything,theprospectsfora
revision of the boj law seem slim indeed. As the conflict








alternative views among lawmakers is ironically a good thing
forcentralbankindependenceatthemoment.
Second,institutionalaffiliationsinformtheunderlyinginter-
ests and power resources of economic policymaking actors,
andinstitutionalreformsareexpectedtochangesomeofthese.31
Over time these new institutional interests and resources
become the exogenous constraints on future policy options.
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Accordingly,thenewboj lawanditsalteredlinkstothebroader
political economy canbe expected to impact thepreferences
andpoliticalresourcesnotonlyofboj officials,butalsopoliti-














embrace fiscal policy as their primary reason for being.is
outcomewouldupholdexistingresearchthatshowsthatmof
officials are particularly concerned with maintaining at least
procedural autonomy, even at the expense of substantive
issues,32 andthatincreasedpoliticizationcausesofficials“toshy
awayfromimpossibletasksandtoformalizeitsresponsibilities
for the tasks that remain.”33 Similarly, as Berhnard’s conflict
avoidanceargumentmentionedabovesuggests,boj independ-
enceenablespoliticianstolargelyavoiddirectresponsibilityfor
the increasingly difficult task of settingmonetary policy not











was supported further by an increase in power resources
provided by this new institutional form. Just as institutions
shapemeaning,identities,andideas,theyalsoshapethedistri-
butions of relative power thatwill influence outcomes in the
future.35 e boj is expected to gain some relative political
advantagesthroughthereform,becausethenewlawprovides
themeanstodevelopasignificantinformationadvantageover
themof andothers. boj officials no longer need to share as
muchinformationwiththemof,andtheirexcessiveresponse
to the transparency requirement enables them to use their




boj didwhen it anticipated independencewas to establish a
Dietliaisonsectionchargedwithattendingtopoliticians’ques-
tions.evastmajorityofpoliticianshavefarlessexpertisein
finance than do boj officials.us, duringmany sessions in
which boj officials were asked to explain how the financial
systemworks,theseliaisonteamswereabletoexplaintheboj’s
thinkingbehindpolicydecisions.37 us,despite somepoliti-
cians’ obvious disagreements with boj policy, over time this
day-to-day interaction has increased the boj’s access to and
relationshipswith politicians from all parties.is is quite a
radicaltransformationfromthepre-centralbankindependence
periodwhentheboj’spoliticalresourceswereminimal.Finally,
drawing from prospect theory and the idea of hysteresis,
althoughboj officialshadbeenreluctanttopursueindepend-
ence too aggressively for fear of damaging their careers and
relationshipswiththemof iftheyfailed,itisnotunreasonable
topredictthatnowthattheboj hastastedindependence,they
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willbemuchmoreaggressiveintryingtopreservetheirinde-
pendence than theywere in trying to obtain it.38 Conversely,
oncemof officialsbecomeaccustomedtolifewithoutrespon-
sibilityformonetarypolicy,theywillbelessmotivatedtoregain
it. Taken together, the impact of a new institutional form is
expected—overtime—tochangethepreferencesandtherelative
power resources available to the relevant actors inways that
willperpetuatecentralbankindependence.39
ird,centralbankindependenceinJapanwillbesupported
in the international context. is includes a near-universal
ideationalconsensusconcerningthedesirabilityofcentralbank












certain outcomes.41 is is in part because, like institutions,
dominantideascanconstrainone’svisionaboutequallygood
orbetteralternatives. IntheJapanesecase, it iscertainlytrue
thatforyearsmanyJapaneseinandoutofgovernmentseemed
willing, if not eager, to resist neoliberal ideology and liberal
financialmarkettrendssoavidlysupportedbytheUnitedStates




Before the reform, foreign governments and market actors
 JenniferHoltDwyer
generallyinterpretedJapan’spoliticaleconomyasslowlyleaving
behind “traditional” ways and anticipating some movement






national ideational consensus on the purported benefits of
centralbankindependenceshouldaddintellectualbackingand
international legitimacy to other domestic supports for con-
tinued independence of the bank. Even if the scholarship




tohelpperpetuatecentralbank independence in Japan is the











agencies in 998, it is not unreasonable to assume that as
outstanding debt increases, so does the mof’s concern with
how tokeep interest rates lowandmanage repayment in the
future.Certainlyby,whentheratingofJapan’sgovernment
debtwas downgradedbelow the ratings forGreece andBot-
swana,theJapanesegovernmentwasacutelyawareofhowthe















financial institutions and foreign investors. In the 98s, the
Japanese government offered only token reforms to placate





marketswas discussed above as a factor in the government’s
decision to grant greater central bank independence. Since
998, however, the situation has not improved significantly.












law. It is clear, however, that maintaining the law does not
necessarilyrequireupholdingallaspectsofthelawinpractice.





pressure the boj to accommodate its generally more liberal
preferencesthroughgreaterinterventionintheselectionofthe
governorandvicegovernor.Atpresent,thisismanifestinthe
opposition approval of certain former bureaucrats by some
politicians or their insistence that the next appointments be
givenonlytothosewhoexpressafirmcommitmenttoinflation






means to garner electoral support in this era of heightened
politicaluncertainty.Atthemoment,theDietissplit,withthe
ldp controllingthe lowerhouseandtheDemocraticPartyof
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theywouldnotwintheupcomingelectionunlesstheydemon-
strated through action their commitment to reform Japan’s
troubled domestic financial and administrative institutions.
Increasing central bank independence enabled politicians to
look reformist,deflectblameathome, and restore credibility
overseas.egovernmentbuiltthenewlawaroundtheprinci-
ples of independence and transparency because it wanted to
communicate to domestic constituents and the international
economiccommunitythatitwas“cleaningupitsact.”eboj
reformshowedthatthegovernmentembracedlegitimateand







formations inactors’ interests thatarise through institutional
changethatiscoupledwiththecontinuinginternationalaccept-
ance of central bank independence as a marker for quality







One must remember that securing political support is
necessaryforevenlegallyindependentcentralbanks,andmuch
will depend on the next governor. Unfortunately, during the
centralbank’sfirstfiveyearsofindependence,GovernorHaya-
mi’sseeminglystubborndemeanorfueledcriticismofthebank,




ization were simply brutal. Scandals and the financial crises
escalatedjustashetookoffice,andpoliticiansandbureaucrats
engaged in unusually public and heated public debates. On
March,,Mr.HayamiwasreplacedbyGovernorFukui
who, despite his reputation as a Hayami conservative, was
initiallywelcomedaspoliticallymoresophisticatedandopen-






determinewhether the boj can successfully transition into a





 e impact of international ideational trends on financial market
reformsisdiscussedingreaterdetailinDwyer4b.Onthedevel-
opmentof independenceand transparencyas internationalcentral
bankingstandardsseeMarcussen,especiallypage,Maxfield





5 In addition to the Central Bank Study Group proceedings, see
Nakakita(999:5–56),BankofJapan(996),Cargilletal.(:94–
96),theminutesoftheBankofJapanLawSubcommitteemeetings,
January , 997, and January 4, 997, Diet deliberations 4th
Session,LowerHouseFinanceCommitteeMay7,997,andMay9,







 Fordiscussionofwhatconstitutescentralbank independence, see,












7 Ito andMishkin4,offer a reviewof this critical literature. See
alsoCargill,Hutchinson,andItoandPosen:5.









5 “ldp wantstosettargetforinflation,”e Japan Times. November,












House Council of Economic Advisors.e Council is chaired by











6 Unfortunately, their economic information is not always accurate.













Bank of Japan Independence at Ten Years 7
44 Idonotmean toexaggerate thewelcomeoffered to foreignfirms;
therearestillmanyJapanese,both inandoutofgovernment,who
prefer to keep Japanese business among the Japanese.Widespread




46 “boj Politicians must improve lines of communication.” Nikkei
Weekly.February,7.
47 is upcoming selection process will be particularly difficult and
importantbecausethegovernorandthetwovicegovernors’terms
expire at the same time, and the split Diet has already failed to
approveseveralotherattemptedappointments.
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national organizations such as the United Nations (UN),
InternationalMonetaryFund(imf),andWorldTradeOrgani-
zation(wto).However,althoughJapanesefinancialcontribu-
tions to international organizations have grown significantly,
formalrecognitionofJapan’sinternationalstatureinsuchorgan-











national organizations in the broader international relations
context.As scholars of organizationshavenoted, institutions
frequently exhibit path dependence—a tendency for initial
conditionstopersistdespitechangesinunderlyingfactors.AsI
will demonstrate in section two, path dependence has been
pervasive in internationalorganizations.Despiteconsiderable










the availabilityof credibleoutsideoptionshas contributed to
greaterrelativesuccessintheWorldBank.efinalsectionwill
presentabriefconclusion.






of extending the stabilizing effects of hegemony beyond the
apexofhegemonicpower(Krasner976;Keohane98;Iken-
berry200).Suchinstitutionalrigiditycanbehelpfulformain-









major international organizations. For example, the imf and
theWorldBank officially came into being at a conference of
twenty-ninealliednationsatBrettonWoods,NewHampshire
in 9. Despite the large number of nations present at the








and World Bank have gone by convention respectively to a






their affiliation duringWorldWar ii and plots shares of imf
votingpowerasaproportionofsharesofworldgrossdomestic
product—the most straightforward measure of a country’s
weight in the global economy. By thismeasure, the wartime
Axispowers (Germany, Italy, Japan)have laggedbehind their
actualplaceintheworldeconomydespitethepassingofhalfa
centuryanddramaticshiftsineconomicrealities.Incontrast,
the formerAllied powers (Canada, France,UnitedKingdom,
UnitedStates)remainoverrepresented.3
Similarly, employment at international organizations has
tendedtofavornationalsfromthevictoriouspowersofWorld
Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations 
Warii attheexpenseofdefeatedpowers.Figure7.2plotsthe
number of “leading people” in international organizations by
country of nationality as compiled in 200 by the Union of
InternationalAssociations.Asthegraphindicates,employment
ofnationals fromGermany, ItalyandJapan lagsbehindother
keystatesincludingsubstantiallysmallerstatessuchasBelgium.




isdiscrepancy likelyhasmultiple causes—for example,
due to limited labormarketmobility, Japanesenationalshave




Note: Allies include Canada, France, United Kingdom, and United States. Axis in-
cludes Germany, Italy, and Japan. GDP is nominal. Data from International Monetary
Fund and Rapkin et al. (1997).











Figure 7.1 G7: Ratio of International Monetary Fund voting shares 
to shares of world gross domestic product


























Figure 7.2 Number of “leading people” in international organizations
Source: Union of International Associations.








Figure 7.3 Educational background of “leading people” 
in international organizations
static.Mostnotably,thedistributionofinstitutionalheadquar-




of reasons.Among them: () reducing hardship for nationals
whocancontinuetoresideintheirhomecountry;(2)greater
visibility andopportunities to establish contactswith current
employees;()self-reinforcingnetworkeffects,e.g.,duetothe
tendencyforcurrentemployeestoprefernewhireswithsimilar




tions in the 990sespousingsoundmacroand liberalmarket
policies as a prerequisite to economic growth acquired the
location-specificappellation—”eWashingtonConsensus.”
























this meteoric rise did not immediately translate into greater
status and recognition in major international organizations.
AlthoughGermanyandItalyhavesharedasimilarpredicament,
their representation in the European Union provides some





















opment Program (undp), United Nations Children’s Fund
(unicef),andWorldFoodProgram(wfp)from99to2007.
Japanese nationals have also occupied important leadership
Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations 9
rolesininternationalorganizationsasepitomizedbytheformer
UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,OgataSadako.
Japanese voting shares in the imf andWorldBankhave also
graduallymovedtowardsabetterreflectionofJapan’sweightin
theworldeconomy.
Variations in Japan’s Position in International Organizations
Although Japan has demonstrated important leadership and
secured some notable gains in international organizations,
progresshasnotbeenuniformacrossinstitutionalsettings.In
thissection,IwillarguethatthedegreeofJapanesesuccesshas







arrangements, is a zero sum game. If the presidency of an
organization is given to one nation, another nation will be
prevented from occupying the same position. Increasing the
votingpowerofonenationwillinevitablydecreasethevoting
powerofanother.InanorgansuchastheUNSecurityCouncil,
it is possible to addnewpermanentmemberswithout elimi-
nating existingmembers. However, even in such an additive
case,the inclusionofnewmemberswillhaveadilutiveeffect
on the voting power of existingmembers, particularly if the
newmembersaregivenaveto.Hence,favorablechangesinthe
statusquoofinternationalorganizationshavegenerallymateri-























and Russia, but also a supermajority of developing countries
withintheGeneralAssembly.




on the agenda. Reform requires a supermajority vote, but
becausevotesareroughlyallocatedbyeconomicweight,devel-
oped countries carry a disproportionate share of votes, and




voting shares since the 980s, progress on the UN Security
Councilhasprovendifficult.
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
Finally, Japan’s bargaining leverage has not been uniform
acrossinstitutionalsettings.Fromamaterialstandpoint,Japan’s




a limitation dictated by the Japanese constitution. However,





Japan in the Bretton Woods Institutions
e imf and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development(ibrd)oftheWorldBank6 havevirtuallyidentical
de jure rulesforthedistributionofvotingpower.Votingpower
is largely determined according to the share of subscriptions
heldbyeachmemberstate.7 Inturn,subscriptionsharesareto






shares.8 However,thede facto processforredistributingshares













produced greater institutional competition compared to the
policyareaof the imf—balanceofpayments lending.Among
other reasons, balance of payments lending ismore likely to
require broad coverage of international economic conditions






agencies. In contrast, balance of payments lending has been
generally dominated by the imf, with occasional assistance
fromotherinternationalfinancialinstitutions(ifis)andcreditor
states.
Hence, amember state that isdissatisfiedwith the status














Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations
Japan’s push for greater status in the Bretton Woods
institutions
Intheearly980s,Japanesepolicymakersinitiatedacampaign
for greater representation and voice in the Bretton Woods
institutions. Japanese representatives made it clear that they
felttheexistingdistributionofsharesfailedtoreflecttheunder-
lyingeconomicreality.11 Inparticular,Japanpushedforunam-











































IMF GDP (Nominal)World Bank IBRD
Figure 7.4 Relative shares: Japan vs. USA
Japanese officials pursued an unusually aggressive bargain
strategy,threateningtowithholdfinancialcontributionstothe
institutionsifitsobjectiveswerenotmet.13 Inthissection,Iwill















in 98 for the ibrd but not until 998 for the imf, a lag of
thirteenyears.16
Qualitative evidence
Qualitative evidence reinforces the observed trend in voting
shares.Specifically, Japanhassuccessfullyexertedadegreeof





vis-à-vis theWorld Bank.is cannot be said of the imf, as
became painfully apparent during the Asian financial crisis
withrespecttotheAsianMonetaryFund(amf).Japaneseinflu-
enceoverimf conditionalitieswasseverelylimited.Proposals
Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations 







99 with the issuance of “Overseas Economic Cooperation
FundOccasionalPaperNo.,”whichemphasizedgovernment-





to promote its developmental philosophy through its own
foreignaidchannelsaswellastheadb,givingfurtherreason




dent Lewis Preston is said to have remarked, “If there is a
systemouttherethatisabettermousetrapthantheonewe’ve
got,weoughttouseit”(Awanohara99,7).













suchasmarket liberalizationandstructural reform.Until the
vergeof the crisis,WorldBank economists gaveAsian econ-
omiessuchasIndonesiaacleanbillofhealthinwhatwascalled
a“haloeffect,”basedontheimpressivetrackrecordofeconomic




packages. en-World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz













At the time, the main issue at stake was whether to





eliminated—however,wewereopposed to the imf sticking
itsnoseintothesesortsofpoliticalorstructuralproblems.
Sakakibara goes on to describe how he and his deputy,
Watanabe Tatsuro, engaged in a two hour-long “very heated
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7
argument(dai-gekiron)”withtheimf missionchiefonOctober
6threateningthat“ifyou ignoretheopinionof the Japanese
governmenttothisextent,wewillhavetoconsiderouroptions
….”18 However,despite thisovert interventionby thehighest-
levelinternationalfinancialauthoritiesinJapan,imf policydid
notbudge.





for the perspective that they operate in policy areas with
differentdegreesoffeasibleoutsideoptions.






presidency since the Bank’s inception. Woo Cumings (99)
also points to direct Japanese leadership at the policy level,




ship of the adb includes theUnited States as well as fifteen
European countries representing the core leadership of the
BrettonWoodsinstitutions.Japan’swillingnesstocommittoan
active leadership role in the adb is indicative of how Japan
mightactinotherinternationalorganizationsifnototherwise
constrained.
Japan maintains considerable influence over adb policy,











Unlike theadb, theAsianMonetary Fundwas proposed
duringtheheightoftheAsianfinancialcrisisbutnevercame
into existence. According to Sakakibara (2000, 80–82), the
JapaneseMinistryofFinancebeganseriousworkontheamf
proposal following the imf-sponsoredai support meeting
held in Tokyo on August , 997. He asserts that an “Asian
sense of solidarity” pervaded thismeeting andbecame a key
factor in his decision to promote the amf plan. e ai
bailout package exposed imf underfunding and served as a
model for the amf by demonstrating that pooling abundant
Asian reserves could be an effective strategy in dealingwith
financialcrises.eamf wouldalsoobviatetediousandtime-







hour conversation, Summers allegedly criticized the plan for
excludingtheUnitedStatesandallowingforactionautonomous
of the imf. e United States saw the enforcement of imf
conditionality as crucial to resolving the Asian crisis, and
perceivedtheamf asencouragingneedlessmoralhazardand
duplicationofimf functions.
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e amf presented a conundrum for Japanese officials.
Japanese actions during the Asian crisis, including the amf,
reflectedfrustrationwithitsinabilitytoobtaindesiredoutcomes
with the imf. As part of the newMiyazawa initiative, Japan
tooktheunusualstepofprovidingasmallamountofbilateral
balance of payments lending toMalaysia, a country that had
rejectedimf orthodoxyandimposedcapitalcontrols.Afterthe
crisis,JapanalsoinitiatedtheChiang-Maiinitiative(cmi),which
would provide limited amounts of bailout lending to Asian
economiesincrisis.However,Japanesepolicyhas,byandlarge,
soughttotieamf andcmi financingtoimf lendingratherthan
createanalternativesourceofconditionality.iswasoneof
the factors that ultimately undermined the amf. If the amf
were tobemerely a supplementalfinancingmechanismwith
noindependencevis-à-vistheimf,aregionalinstitutionwould
be unnecessary, and supplementing the resources of the imf
woulddo.
Nonetheless, the amf proposal produced a raremoment
whenaregionalalternativetotheimf appearedcredible.is
emergenceofapotentialoutsideoptionbroughtaboutadjust-
menton the sideof the imf.Sakakibara (2000, 86) suggests
thattheUnitedStatesenticedAsiannationsawayfromtheamf











explanations.Although each contains someelementof truth,
noneofthesealternativesprovidesafullaccountoftheevidence.
First, a neorealist scholar of international relationsmight
argue that Japan’s comparative success in the World Bank
reflectsunderlyingpowerasymmetriesintherespectiveinsti-
tutionalareas.Putanotherway,Japan’sinfluenceininternational
institutionsmay simply reflect discrepancies between Japan’s









elements of the empirical evidence. For one, if institutions
merelyreflectunderlyingeconomicstrength,Japanshouldhave
been much more influential in the World Bank during the
990s,anditsvotingshareshouldhaveexceededorcomecloser
to thatof theUnitedStates. Inaddition, the timingofevents
would also appear to be inconsistent with a realist account.
Japan’sfinancialstrengthpeakedintheearly990sanddeclined
rapidly thereafter,while levelsof foreignaid remained strong
untilveryrecently.However,Japan’svotingstrengthintheimf
rosegradually from.8% in980to.6% in990to6.% in
998. Voting shares in the World Bank rose more quickly,
although Japan did not become the number one donor until
992.
Second,onemightargue that Japan’s influence ineachof
theBrettonWoodsinstitutionsisafunctionofeffort.Perhaps
Japan has tried more tenaciously to secure influence in the
Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations 
WorldBankthanintheimf.Again,thereissometruthtothis
hypothesis. Japan’s efforts to secure greater representation in









reallocate resources, Japanese representation in the imf
continued to lagbehind that in theWorldBank. In addition,
effortprovidesverylittleleverageoverthedistinctfatesofthe
adb and the amf, whichwere both promoted vigorously by
Japanesefinancialofficials.Finally,explanationsbasedoneffort
sufferfromanendogeneityproblem—ifJapaneseofficialsrealize
thatsecuringpreferredoutcomes in the imf areprohibitively
difficult, their effortswill naturally be redirected towards the
WorldBank.
ird, a criticmight argue that theobservedphenomena
areduetohistoricalaccidentsorpurelyincidentalfactors.Asin




atic analysis of cross-national voting shares yields similar
results—sharesintheWorldBankhaveexhibitedgreaterflexi-
bility over time than shares in the imf for allmember states
(Lipscy 2008). It should also be noted that the salience of






organizational architecture, although significant challenges
remain. In relative terms, Japan’s economic and geopolitical















tions can be notoriously destabilizing for the international
system,oftenproducinggeopolitical tensions (Organski 98;
Kennedy987)oreconomicturbulence(Kindleberger986).If
majorinternationalorganizationsallowforsmoothpowertran-
sitions, such destabilization may be mitigated. On the other





Eisuke for themanaging directorship of the imf in 2000. Finance
MinisterMiyazawaKiichinotedthat:“enominationofDr.Sakak-
ibarareflectedJapan’spositionthattheimf,asatrulyglobalfinancial
institution, should determine its Managing Director based on a
Japan’s Shifting Role in International Organizations 
candidate’sabilityto leadthis institutionintherightdirectionand
not based on his/her country of origin.” (imf External Relations
Department,“Mr.Yoshimura’sStatementoneWithdrawalofthe






















European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Council of
EuropeDevelopmentBank,CaribbeanDevelopmentBank.
 “Becauseof the insufficient adjustmentofquota sharesduring the




Haruo (AlternativeGovernor of the Fund and theBank of Japan),
Summary Proceedings of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings,98,
p. 9. “I would like to emphasize that an extensive adjustment of




their relative economic positions in the world economy and thus
allowtheFundtofunctionsmoothly.”StatementbyWatanabeMichio
(GovernoroftheFundandtheBankofJapan),Summary Proceedings
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Japan’s Strategic Response 








is among the most vigorous and dynamic on earth and has
morethandoubledoverthepastfiveyears.
Despite their deep and growing economic ties, however,








of simultaneous Chinese and Japanese power and affluence
beguntomaterialize.Aless-developedChinahasbeengrowing

Sino-Japanese Energy Relations: 
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rapidly,whileamoreaffluentandmatureJapanhasremained














animated by China’s explosive economic growth, the energy
dimensionofSino-Japaneserivalryappearsincreasinglysalient.
Yettheprospectsforenergycooperationarealsorising.Energy
ties are an especially interesting aspect of the Sino-Japanese
relationshipbecausetheyareapowerful“double-edgedsword,”
with the potential to sharply leverage either cooperation or
conflictbetweenthesetwogiants.
Contrasting Resource Endowments
Japan is singularlydeficient inenergy resources,withonly59
millionbarrelsofprovenoilreserves—aboutaten-dayssupply






a full 99 percent of its entire oil and gas supply must be
imported.
KentE.Calder
China, in contrast, is significantly better endowed with
domestic energy resources, including coal reserves that rival
thoseoftheUnitedStatesasthelargestonearthandsignificant
oil reserves as well. Indeed, China remains the world’s sixth
largestoilproducer,5 continuingtodrawheavilyonlargenorth-
eastern fields, such as Daqing, that are only slowly moving
towarddepletion.Anditistheworld’slargestcoalproduceras
well as its largest consumer of coal. Yet environmental and
infrastructuralproblems,compoundedbyaChinesereluctance
to offer foreign investors the incentives necessary to access










escape from these painful energy dilemmas, but they often
presentproblemsoftheirownintheformofterritorialdisputes
withChina’sneighbors.
China’s coal reserves, as indicated above, are even more
massive than its substantial oil deposits, and the country
depends on coal for seventy percent of total primary energy
consumption.6 Yet, as in the case of oil, transportation also






Sino-Japanese Energy Relations 
Differing Energy Security Imperatives
Flowingfromtheirdifferingresourceendowmentsandpositions
in the global political economy, China and Japan have con-
trastingconceptionsofenergysecurity.edetailshavevaried
somewhat across their respectivemodern histories and pro-
ducedbroadcontrastsinincentivestructures.esecontrasting
imperatives animate the shifting patterns of cooperation and
conflict that have emerged over the past two generations of
interactionbetweenthesetwogreatpowersofAsia.
4 KentE.Calder
Source: US Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy.
Figure 8.1 China’s complex energy geography
JapanhasbyfarthelargesteconomyinAsia,withagdp of
wellover$4trillion.Reflectingitshugeeconomyanditsradical
lack of domestic energy reserves, Japan also has by far the
largestoil imports intheregion,atover4millionbarrelsper
day, aswell as liquified natural gas (lng) imports that reach
roughlyhalfoftheentireworld’stotal.eseimportsofbothoil
and gas flowheavily from theMiddleEast,where Japan gets
nearly90percentof itsoilandapproximatelyone-thirdofits
gas.ebulkofenergy importsflowthrougheither Japanese
trading companies or multinational energy firms, since the
private-sectorJapaneseenergyproducersarenotwelldeveloped.






Geopolitically, those interests are safeguarded by the United






explosively growing economy. China’s oil consumption, for
example, rose .9 percent in 005, compared to only a .4
percentincreaseinJapan.8
Inabsoluteterms,China’senergydemandremainssurpris-
ingly small, relative to its huge population, due to low per-
capitaenergyconsumption.In005,Chinaconsumedlessthan
sevenmillionbarrelsofoilperday, littlemorethanonethird
the total of the United States, although slightly more than
Japan’s5.millionbarrelsperday.9 Yetthisaggregatedemand
seems fated to growmassively in the future, as Chinese per
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations 5
capitaenergyconsumptionisstillonlyone-fifthofUSandone-
tenthofJapaneselevels.us,amajorenergysecurityimpera-










Chinabadlyneeds railways,ports, andpipelines to transport
energy.Japanalreadyhasthem.
ethirdmajordifferencebetweenJapanandChina’senergy
incentive structure is geopolitical. Japan is a close ally of the
UnitedStates,withitscommandinginfluenceintheglobalsea
lanes, whereas China remains on delicate terms withWash-
ington.Consequently,Chinatendstoseeitsenergysecurityas




A History of Energy Cooperation
Ironically, in view of recent geopolitical rivalries, yet under-
standably, considering national resource endowments, Japan
and China have a long history of energy cooperation. China
beganexportingoil to Japan in974,halfadecadebeforethe
economic acceleration impelled by the FourModernizations.
isSino-Japaneseenergysupplyententecontinuedforthirty
years. Reflecting their close geopolitical alignment from the















eTyumenfields, by contrast,were ,00miles from Japan
and required complex combined rail and tanker transport.
ReflectingtheseSino-Japanesegeographicalcomplementarities,









oilexports,and7.percentof Japan’stotaloil imports.11 is
traditionoforganizingenergytradethroughcooperativelong-
termtradeagreementsstartedin978.eseagreementshave






Imports fromChinaalsoprovided Japanwithaway tooffset
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations 7
the strategic vulnerabilities of large-scale dependence on the
MiddleEast,whilegainingincreasedleverageinbargainingfor
lower priceswith the producer countries and oilmajors. For
influentialJapanesemanufacturers,suchasNipponSteel,energy
importsfromChinaalsoprovidedameansofincreasingJapa-
nesemanufacturedexports,by linkingChineseoil exports to











ofproducing 00,000 tonsof liquefiednatural gas (lng)per
yearforexportbacktoJapan.






resources in theEastChinaSea, bothbecause it expected to
continueoilflowsfromChinaandalsobecauseitsowncompa-
nieshadbeenfrustratedintheirsearchforoffshoreoil.
China’s Expanding Economy 
Changes the Geopolitical Landscape
is felicitous energy symbiosis between Japan and China
continued into the 990s.Asnoted above, in 990 Japan still
importedover$billionannuallyinoilfromChina.isChinese
8KentE.Calder
oilwasattractive to Japannot somuch for itsquality—Saudi
lightwasmoreattractiveforgasoline,aviationfuel,andmany
other sophisticated applications—but because of the trade




















Between 000 and 005, rising Chinese oil demand ac-
counted for slightly more than one-third of global demand
increases.16 Fueledbyrisingautomobileownershipandsurging







andconsumerdemand, aswell as lingering inefficiencies and
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations 9
pricemisalignments.Gasoline inChina, forexample, retailed
for$.80agalloninmid-005andremainssubstantiallybelow
world prices.17 Refiners, for their part, continually complain
about price controls that inhibit needed investment.Chinese
currentlyconsumeapproximatelytwobarrelsofoilperperson
per year, compared to 8 barrels in the United States, and
China’susagewillinevitablyrise.




less pronounced course. In 00, China imported nearly 70
million tons of crude oil, yet only 7 percent of this total—
mainlyfromRussiaandKazakhstan—arrivedbyrail.erest—
70KentE.Calder
Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook (until 2003) and BP Statistical Review of World
 Energy, 2005 and 2006 editions (until 2005).









Unit: barrels per day




is an increasingly important economic rationale for its close
politicalalliancewiththeUnitedStates.18 Yetsealanedepend-




ence that are of national concern. Only 0 percent of its
importedoilcomesinChinesetankers,with90percentbeing
shipped to China by foreign fleets. And between 80 and 85
percent of China’s oil imports come through the Straits of
Malacca,only.5mileswideatitsnarrowestpoint.Handling
millionbarrelsofoiland40billioncubicmetersofnaturalgas
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations 7
Source: US Department of Energy. Annual Energy Outlook, 2005 edition.
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e historical record suggests that China fears energy
dependenceonthebroaderworld,andthatithassomereason
todoso.Sovietadvisorsinthe950splayedamajorroleinthe
Chinese oil industry, and their departure following the Sino-




oil andnatural gas as a geopolitical lever inRussia’s dealings
withneighbors,suchastheUkraine,Moldova,andevenBelarus,
overthepastdecade.
Chinese analysts appear to see the United States as a
prospectivethreattoChina’senergysecurity,althoughBeijing’s
rapidlyescalatingenergyneedsmayalsohavereinforcedChina’s
short-term inclination to avoid confrontation with Wash-
ington.19 ere is no nation powerful enough to balance the






could restrict its options on such strategically and politically
importantissuesasTaiwan.Ataminimum,astheyseeit,the
United States appears disinclined to address issues of Sino-
Americanenergy interdependence in apositive spirit, as evi-
denced by the rejection of ChinaNational Oil Corporation’s
bidforUnocalinthesummerof005.
7KentE.Calder
Reducing Energy Vulnerability: 
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of nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and natural gas, the
supplyofwhichisgenerallylesssusceptibletosealaneinterdic-
tion; () geographical diversification of energy supplies; (4)






have adopted amarkedly differentmix of approaches to the
problem of assuring energy security. is important reality
concentrates the arena of prospective bilateral confrontation
overenergyintoasmallnumberofcriticalareas,suchasoff-
shore oil development in EastAsianwaters and competition
overpipelinesand third-countryconcessions.edivergence










tives in these areashave allowed Japan to remarkably reduce




so keenly a generation ago to compete aggressively in global
energyandraw-materialsmarkets.20




40 percent from levels of the 970s.21 In non-ferrous metal
production, for example, in 004 Japan consumed only 45.8
percentasmuchenergyperunitofproductionas in 97. In
chemicals thisratiowas5.; inpaper/pulp5.; insteel7.5;
andincement8..22
Industrial structure transformation—away from energy-
intensivematerials sectors, such as steel andpetrochemicals,
and toward areas that consume little energy, such as elec-
74 KentE.Calder
Note: Calculated with 1973 figure as 100.
Source: Energy Conservation Center. Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics











Figure 8.4 Japan’s improvement in energy efficiency
tronics—has also helped to substantially reduce aggregate




was strongly encouraged by industrial policy.23 As a conse-
quence,theshareofmaterialsindustriesinJapaneseindustrial
production fell from topercentduring theperiod from
975to005,whilethoseoflessenergy-consumingmetalsand
machinerysectorshasgrownfrom0to5percent.24
Japan has also pursued active alternative energy policies
thatincreaseautonomyfromhydrocarbonimports.emost
significantamongthesepolicieshasbeensupport fornuclear
power that has few equals anywhere else in theworld, apart
fromFrance,Sweden,Russia,andSouthKorea.In97only0.
percent of Japan’s primary energy supply was provided by
nuclearpower,but thatratiorose toahighof.7percent in
998.25 After years of economic uncertainty, political contro-
versy,andderegulationduringandjustaftertheAsianfinancial




nomic policy has long emphasized its mercantilist character
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Japanese and Chinese approaches diverge sharply with
respecttothethreefinaloptionsdiscussedaboveforassuring
energy security.With respect to geographical diversification,
Japan has heretofore largely accepted the long-term market
logicofrelianceonMiddleEasternoilsupplies.Ithasconsis-
tently relied on a small number of producers in the Persian
Gulf—particularlySaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates,and
Iran—forwellover80percentofitstotalimports.28
China, in sharp contrast to Japan, has made substantial
efforts to diversify away from theMiddleEast, resulting in a
dependence ratio in 005 on that region of only around 45
percent,orlittlemorethanhalfthatofJapan.AlthoughChina
has, to some degree, exploited geopolitical tensions between
theUnited States and Iran to encroachon Japan’s traditional
specialrelationshipwiththelattercountry,29 whatisfarmore
strikingisthevigorofitsnewrelationshipswithAfricanenergy
producers with which Japan is virtually uninvolved. China
procured nearly one-third of its oil imports from Africa in
005;30 the continent is only a marginal supplier for Japan.
Indeed,in00and007,AngolacompetedcloselywithSaudi
Arabia as the largest exporter in the world of oil to China.
ChineseoilimportsfromAngolain005,atover7milliontons
annually,werefarmorethantriplewhattheyhadbeenin00.
Reflecting its deepening energy interdependence with
Africa,Chinahasgivenasubstantialprioritytothatcontinent





















cross-pressures in Iran and elsewhere have at times slowed
theiradvance.AlthoughnominallyaSocialistnation,Chinahas




Flashpoints of Sino-Japanese Competition
Although direct Sino-Japanese energy competition over the
pastdecadehasbeensurprisinglysubduedduetoadomestic,















is enhancedby their closeproximity to areasof rapid energy
demandincreasealongChina’ssoutheasterncoast,asshownin
Figure8.forwhichtherearefewalternativesourcesofsupply.


































onbroader securitymattersandattain its acquiescence inan
enhancedJapanesemilitaryposture.High-leveldiscussionshave





with respect to pipeline diplomacy. China’s energy imports
fromRussiahavebeenrising;RussiabecameChina’sfifthlargest
oil supplier in 004. Yet Japan also has strong aspirations to









tained for more than a decade. Ultimately, still wanting to
secureasmanyAsiancustomersaspossible,Russiadecidedto
branchtheprospective4,88-kilometerpipelineatSkovorodino
near the Russian-Chinese border, themidpoint of the entire

















to compete with each other. China’s strong geopolitical ties
withIranandJapan’sdifficultyinmatchingthemduetotheUS-
JapanallianceareaparticularfrustrationforJapaneseaspirations
that could seriously complicate Sino-Japanese and even US-
Japanrelations.
In the longer run a crucial issue in Sino-Japanese energy




that situation. How Sino-Japanese rivalries work themselves
out in theGulf,especiallyasChineseenergydemandrises to








































erate was dramatically expressed in PrimeMinisterWen Jia
Bao’s March 007 opening address at the National People’s
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oftheprogram.Hecalledforredoubledeffortsinenergyconser-
vationandthereductionofpollutiondischargelevels.
An additional area for potential enhanced cooperation is
nuclearenergy.In00,Chinaannouncedthatitwouldspeed
uptheconstructionofnuclearpowerplantsfromthecurrent












sees the importance of Sino-Japanese, and indeed US-Sino-
Japanese,energycooperation.42
Notes
 SeeNicholasKristof,“eRiseofChina,”Foreign Affairs, November/
December99,7(5).
 See Kent E. Calder, “Simmering Sino-Japanese Rivalries,” Foreign
Affairs, April/May,00:–.
 In004Japanconsumedabout5.5millionbarrels.SeeUSDepart-





Prize: e Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.NewYork:Simon
andSchuster.
8KentE.Calder





Okimoto. 98. Pioneer and Pursuer: e Role of the State in the
Evolution of the Japanese and American Semiconductor Industries.
Stanford: StanfordUniversityNortheastAsia-UnitedStatesForum
onInternationalPolicy.
8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June00edition,p..













5 BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June00edition,p.0.








8 SeeKentE.Calder.99. Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America’s
Future in Asia. NewYork:WilliamMorrow.
Sino-Japanese Energy Relations8
9 SeeAaronL.Friedberg.00.“Going Out”: China’s Pursuit of Natural
Resources and Implications for the PRC’s Grand Strategy. Vol.7,No.
.Seattle:NationalBureauofAsianResearchSeptember,p.0.
0 On this earlier tendency, seeRaymondVernon. 98.Two Hungry
Giants: e United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores.
Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress.
 Agency for Resources and Energy, Japan’s Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry. Energy White Paper, 00 edition. [Available
online] http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/00Energy-
HTML/html/i0000.html.
 Energy Conservation Center. Handbook of Energy and Economic
Statistics in Japan, 00edition,8–9.
 Energy Conservation Center. Handbook of Energy and Economic
Statistics in Japan, –.
4 MinistryofEconomy,Trade,andIndustryAgencyforResourcesand




 Chalmers Johnson.98. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford:
StanfordUniversityPress.
7 OntheeffectivenessoftheAmericanstateinenergydiplomacy,see
StephenKrasner.978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials
Investments and US Foreign Policy.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press.From005to007,Krasnerservedasdirectorofpolicyplan-
ningintheUSStateDepartment.












orcooperation?InSeabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or
Cooperation, pp. 5–.WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilson Interna-
tionalCenterforScholars.
 Onthetechnicaldetailsofthisconflict,seeSeligHarrison.Seabed
Petroleum in Northeast Asia.
4 Kyodo News,May9,005andApril7,005.
5 Kyodo News,April8,00.





followedby Japan in 00.BothChina and Japanhope tofinalize
withtheGulfCooperationCouncilduring007.SeeFinancial Times,
September8,00;andFinancial Times, January8,007.
8 Sinocast China Business Daily News,October,00.




for Natural Resources and Energy. New National Energy Strategy




























Japanese diplomats highly suspicious of Chinese intentions
agreedthatAbe’svisittoChinahadgoneextremelysmoothly,
and emphasized that China’s approbation of postwar Japan





marked a crucial turning point (author interviews in Beijing,












receivedfront-pagecoverageintheNew York Times (December
, 2006) for advocating regionalmonetary cooperation: “We
believe that someUSdollardepreciationwouldbenecessary,
and collective joint appreciation of the East Asian countries
couldbeneeded”tomanagethatdecline(seealsoKawai2005).
Further East Asian summits occurred in the Philippines and
Singapore.epreliminaryagreementreachedattheSix-Party
talks inFebruary200held thefirstpromiseof resolving the
NorthKoreannuclearcrisissincetheBushadministrationtook
officeahalfdozenyearsearlier.
Despite recent cause for cautious optimism, skepticism
about prospects for Sino-Japanese relations and regional co-
operation runs deep. e Japanese government constantly
complainsabouttheChinesemilitarybudgetandChinesenaval
activities.Popularopinion in JapanaboutChinahas fallen to
all-time lows, while attitudes toward Korea, always volatile,
have grown frostier. East Asian integration has not excited
muchpopular interest in Japan, but to the extent they know
about it, citizens seemskepticalorhostile.eUnitedStates




on prospects for regional integration, arguing that existing
regional institutions and schemes amount to littlemore than
paperagreementsandtalkingshops.
How shouldwe understand this contrast between deeply
embedded skepticism and recent upturns? No doubt those
upturns stemat least inpart from randomfluctuation in the
politicalarena.Asrecentlyasthespringof2005,anti-Japanese
demonstrations swept Chinese cities, and renewed conflict
could easily breakout over recently renewed coverageof the
“rapeofNanking”;“comfortwomen,”thesubjectofaresolution




At the same time, something deeper and longer-term in










integrated and that pressures to cooperate on financial and




leaders also see a need to accommodate long-term moves
toward some kind of East Asian community and a more
multilateralinternationalorder(Noble200).isdevelopment
Japan’s Business Community in Sino-Japanese Relations 
isconsistentwiththeargumentofJacobsandPage(2005)that
business elites exert a disproportionate influence on foreign
policy. It can also be seen as supporting Solingen’s (2005)
contentionthatoutward-orientedcoalitionsaremorelikelyto
supportregionalintegration.
Hostility and Skepticism toward China and Asia
Despite the recent, and possibly temporary, upturn in Sino-
















recently) of aggressive and even hostile comments by the
governmentsorleadingpoliticiansoftheNortheastAsiancoun-
tries.Startinginthemid-0s,JapaneseattitudestowardChina







In contrast, Japan has experienced fewer direct conflicts
withSoutheastAsiancountries since the endof theVietnam
War.AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(asean)countries
havehadlittleoccasiontovoicecriticismsofJapan,andpopular
imagesofSoutheastAsia in Japanhavesteadily improved.By
200,5percentofJapaneseadultsreportedthatrelationswith




which helps account for the otherwise puzzling volatility in
“affinity.” Second,with regard tomost countries and regions,
suchasNorthAmerica,Europe,andSoutheastAsia,thestate
of bilateral relations receives significantly higher ratings than
doesaffinity;theonlyexceptionsappeartobesmallandfriendly
AustraliaandNewZealand,whichelicitreportsofbothpositive
relations and affinity from about two-thirds of the Japanese
public. In contrast, when it comes to China, affinity clearly
exceedsperceptionsofbilateralrelations,suggestingthatJapa-
nese do, in fact, feel a degree of underlying regional identity






opposition, with negative opinions outweighing supportive





Certainly, anti-Chinese sentiment is so pervasive on the
Japaneserightastoconstituteanobsession.Forexample,inthe




always pejoratively. e orientation of Hiramatsu Shigeo, a
specialistontheChinesemilitary featuredregularly inSeiron
andotherconservativejournals,emergesclearlyfromthetitle
ofhis 2006bookChina will Annex Japan (Hiramatsu 2006).
Justincaseanyreadersremainedindoubtastothegravityof
theperceivedthreatfacingJapan,thenextyearhepublisheda








Studies and a professor at Tokyo’s Obirin University. Tokyo
UniversityLibraryholds26ofhisworksinitscollections,most
of them published by the respectable mainstream publisher
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Watanabe Toshio sounded a similar warning about the
dangerous,bizarre,fantasyofanEastAsiancommunity(Wata-
nabe 2005:206–), but whereas center-left journals such as
Ronza provided considerable coverage andSekai published a
special issue (January 2006)on theoccasionof thefirstEast
Asian summit, the conservative journals largely ignored the
summits.
If the Japanese government has not adopted a stance as
negativeasthatofconservativecommentatorsoreventhemass
public,ithascertainlyexpressedgreatconcernaboutdevelop-





economic zones by Japan (Boeicho 2006:4–42, 40).China’s
successfultestofitsabilitytodestroyasatelliteinspaceraised






flat, just as Japan’s “one-percent of gdp” cap allowed large
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protectionoftheworld’sdominantmilitarypower,Chinaviews
the United States as a security threat, and its own defense
budget isdwarfedby thatof theUS.Furthermore, Japanand
especiallytheUnitedStatesalsohavenumerous“extra”alloca-
tions for defense that are not always transparent (cf. Kaplan
200).Moreover,Chinesemilitary“incursions”typicallyinvolve
contested territory or economic zones. Although the United
States and Russia have also destroyed satellites and resisted
Chinese calls to demilitarize space, these considerations are
virtually never aired in Japan. Yet as long asChina’smilitary
capacityincreasesrapidly,includesmissilestippedwithnuclear



































ership inAsia (Green 2006:06–), and that their invocation
remainstentativeandselective(Katsumata2006).
Insum,Japanesepublicopiniondemonstratesconsiderable
skepticism if not hostility toward China.e rising military
capabilitiesofChinaandtheaggressiveresponsesoftheAmer-




have an opinion, Japanese citizens apparently havemixed to
jaundicedviewsofregionalcooperation,whilemostacademics
havebeenskepticalabouttheprospectsforregionalintegration.
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from the domesticmarket and expect that share to continue
rising steadily (author interviews in Beijing,November 2006
withJapanExternalTradeOrganization[jetro], JapanAuto-












about rising wages and decreasing tax breaks, and tentative
evidence that some firms are seeking to avoid putting all of
theirbasketsinonemarketbydiversifyingtoVietnam,Japanese
firms remain overwhelmingly more interested in expanding
theiractivitiesinChinathanelsewhere(jetro 200:6,).
Initially,skepticswonderedwhetherChinacouldwithstand
the shock of entering thewto, and if it would abide by the
unprecedentedly draconian conditions under which it was





renewing his bet in 4, he titled his third versionEven So,







rule of the Communist Party could be costly. Second, the
Chinese economy has grown so important to Asia and the
worldthatitisnotinJapan’sinterestsforChinatocollapse.For
Japan's neighbors South Korea, a vital if occasionally prickly




ship with asean. e re-ignition of Chinese growth raised
fears that asean would lose foreign direct investment and
exportmarkets,orattheleastthatthespeedofChineseentry
wouldcreatelosersaswellaswinnersandforcejarringadjust-
ments inneighboringeconomies in theprocess (Eichengreen
andTong2006;Ravenhill2006),complicatinglifeforJapanese
investors.Governments inasean feeltheneedforeconomic




Japanese Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation
Japanesepoliticalleadershaveconsistentlyendorsedtheprin-
ciple of East Asian community. Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s announcement of a “Hashimoto doctrine” during a
triptoasean countriesinadvertentlycontributedtothe
creationofasean+3.Fiveyearslater,ontheoccasionofanother
Southeast Asian visit, Prime Minister Koizumi delivered an
“extraordinarilyimportant”policyspeechinSingapore(Tanaka
Japan’s Business Community in Sino-Japanese Relations 





Japan-asean relationship.…e first step is tomake the
bestuseoftheframeworkofasean+3.4
eldp notonlyacceptedthisvision,butranonit.Item
0of theparty’selectoralmanifesto for the2005election to
theHouseofRepresentativescommittedthepartyto“exercise








advocated active Japanese leadership to promote East Asian
cooperation,whileMinistryofEconomy,Trade,andIndustry
(meti)Vice-MinisterWatanabeHiromichiadvancedtheMinis-
try’s line that foreign policy toward Asia and other dynamic
regions,alongwithenhancementofproductivityandinnovation,
constituted the three pillars of Japanese economic policy
(statements atHouseofCouncilorsCommitteeonEconomy,
Industry,andEmployment,November,2006).
Differences of emphasis are not hard to find, of course.













ForeignMinister Aso Taro, also known for his hard-line
stancetowardChina,chosetomakeavirtueofnecessity.While
defending East Asian engagement and socialization against
skeptics,theperennialprimeministerialcandidatearguedfor
mobilizingJapaneseresourcestogarnerrecruitsforauniversal
values campaign along a vast Eurasian “arc of freedom and
prosperity.”HechampionedJapan’s leadershipandexperience
and its ability to serve as a “thought leader” for the region.
Despite his constant talk of universal values, he emphasized
thatJapanwouldnotimposeitsvaluesonothersandwouldnot
always completely agree about values even with the United
States (House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee,
December3,2006).
Other parties also have largely supported the concept of
communitybuildinginEastAsia.eldp’scoalitionpartner,
Komeito,traditionallyhashadclosertiestoChina,soempha-




countries not lead to an influxof foreignworkers competing
withitsconstituents(HouseofRepresentativesPlenaryMeeting,
October26,2006).
e Japanese Business Community:
Preferences, Organization, Influence
Milner () notes that multinational corporations tend to
resistprotectionism,sinceitreducestheirabilitytomaneuver







of trade and investment as an opportunity to attain higher
returns,whereasownersofscarcefactors,suchas low-skilled
labor in wealthy countries, are likely to resist the intensified
competition (for historical evidence comparing general and
sector-specificfactorsofproduction,seeHiscox200).us,it






most “multinational” firms remain overwhelmingly national,





Howwell do these approaches predict the preferences of
JapanesefirmstowardEastAsianintegration?Withafewmodi-
fications, quite well. As Frieden and Rogowski (6) would
expect, farmers, small businesses, and organized labor, all of
whichrepresentscarcefactorsinJapan,arehighlyskepticalof
















itability of Japanese banks.Megamergers designed to sop up
excesscapacityalsodelayedtheintroduction,integration,and
upgradingoftheinformationtechnologynecessarytocompete
with American and British banks. Japanese banks lagged far




still not quickly enough to keep pace with the expansion of
Westernbanks.OntheeveoftheAsianfinancialcrisis,Japanese
banksaccountedforalmostone-thirdofallcreditextendedto
Asia bybanks reporting to theBank for International Settle-
ments(bis);in2005theJapanesesharebarelytopped0percent
(Takayasu2006:26).








year, it tookadvantageof theopeningof thebankingmarket
specifiedunderChina’swto entrytoestablishanewChinese
subsidiary.Atthesametime,SumitomoMitsuiBankexpanded
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its network in China and established a new China division
separate from its Asia division. Its research and consulting












the Northeast Asian countries compete vigorously for gas
supplies, they can sometimes act as allies when it comes to
pipelinesandexpensivefacilities.Japanesegasusers,inpartic-
ular,havebeencaughtbetweeninstabilitiesarisingfromenergy
deregulationandcross-entryathomeand theneed for long-
termcontracts in the capital-intensive gas business. Japanese
companiesalsohaveahuge technological lead inenergyeffi-
ciencyandcleanplant technology,whichtheyhopetosell to
China and the rest of Asia, although lack of funding and




gas, oil is a genuinely international commodity, the biggest





Japanese supporters of regional integration are integrated
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trading houses (sogo shosha) and manufacturers.e shosha
havebeenactiveinAsiaforwelloverahundredyears.eyare
particularly active in supplying imports of energy and other
commodities. In less developed countries, such asailand,
Indonesia,orChina,theyplayanevenmoreimportantrolein
organizing regional trade in components and raw materials.
Wherevermarketsareimperfectandinstitutionssuchasbanks
and capitalmarkets immature—as inmost of the developing
world—shosha findprofitableopportunities.
Shosha executives have long served as leaders in major
businessorganizationsandhaveenjoyedintimatecontactswith
government.Shosha haveworked inan informaland low-key
mannerthroughoutSoutheastAsia(Katzenstein2005).Inrela-











supplier to both, but especially to automobile producers, is
anotherforceforintegration.Autoandelectronicsassemblers
sell a growing share of their output in Asia, and they have
developed an intricate division of labor in Asia, increasingly
centered on China. Textile firms also are quite regionalized,
andchemicalsaremovingintoAsiaaswell,butingeneralthose
sectors are much less economically dynamic and are still at
least as concerned with serving and protecting the home
marketasexploitingopportunitiesinAsia.EvenJapan’sfamed
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By and large, Japanese firmsmake their case on regional
integrationbywayof industryassociationsandespecially the
two main peak associations, Nippon Keidanren and Keizai
Doyukai.AstheprimaryagglomerationofJapan’slargestfirms
andmajor industry associations,Keidanrenhas long enjoyed
privilegedaccesstoJapan’srulingpartyanditsprimeministers.
Itselaborateorganizationalstructurecoversvirtuallytheentire










In response to incessant criticisms of incestuous relations
between government and business, in 3 Keidanren relin-
quished its role of establishing quotas for political campaign
contributionsfromlargefirmsandindustryassociationstothe








it resumed political contributions. Once dominated by the
heads of domestically-oriented industrial firms, leadership of
the Keidanren turned to companies from the internationally
tradedgoodssector,thoughservicefirmsremainunderrepre-
sented. Toyoda Shoichiro headed Keidanren from 4 and
,andhissuccessoraschairmanofToyota,OkudaHiroshi,
assumedthetopspotin2002.KeizaiDoyukai,oncethebuttof
punson itsname (“What kindof association?”) also stageda
strongresurgence.etopfiguresatKeizaiDoyukaiwerenot















as half of whom can come from outside of the government.
UnderPrimeMinisterMori,twoeconomistsandtwobusiness
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producerofhalogenlightsandotherelectricalandopticalprod-
ucts,andchairmanofKeizaiDoyukaifrom5to.With
the inauguration of the Abe administration, the two private








tries are important assets for the peak associations and for











regional trade arrangements (Manger 2005; Solis 2003; Pek-
kanen2005).Others,suchasmeti negotiatorSekizawaYoichi
(Sekizawa200)downplaytheroleofindividualfirms,instead





which executives from Toyota have played a crucial role in
recentyears—analystslargelyagree.
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Gregory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e business community’s policy proposals on regional
cooperation






out a somewhat bolder stance on economic reform. eir
approachesarelargelyconsistentwiththepoliciesoftheldp;
indeed, it isnotalwayseasy to tellwho is influencingwhom.
Not surprisingly, both lobby to liberalize labor markets, lift
protectionforagriculture,cutexpenditures,and, ifadditional
revenuesmustcomefromsomewhere,increasetaxesoncon-








rity, and multilateralism. ey refer positively to pacifism,
expressed some doubts about theAmerican invasion of Iraq
evenbeforeitturnedintoanobviousdebacle,andsimplycall
for “consideration” of constitutional revision (KeizaiDoyukai
;2004a;2004b;2006a).
WhenitcomestorelationswithChinaandEastAsia,the
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Minister Abe’s ambiguous but well-received pledge to Korea
andChinathathewoulddealwiththeYasukuniissue“appro-




in a round of mini-shuttle diplomacy between Koizumi and
Chinese leaders thatmaywell have contributed toKoizumi’s
lower-keyapproachtohislastvisitasprimeminister(wearinga
business suit, refraining from entering the main hall, and
professing to visit as a “private citizen," Kyodo, October 22,
2006).
Ina joint “message” to the JapaneseandChinesegovern-
ments, Keizai Doyukai (2006b) called for a forward-looking,
“comprehensive strategic partnership” that could “advance
together”onavarietyofissuesinEastAsiaandtheworld.e
emphasisonAsiashowsupinthecommitteeworkthatisatthe
heart of the Doyukai’s activities. In recent years, of the five
regional subcommittees, thefirst coversAsia and the second
handles China, the only country allocated its own subcom-





Japanese business-academic-diplomatic establishment toward
EastAsianintegrationisbestrevealedbyexaminingthecontent
and evolutionof the report of the “Okudamission” commis-
sionedbyPrimeMinisterObuchiKeizo anddelivered to the
asean+3meetinginNovember(「アジア経済再生ミッ
ション」報告書. ),andKeizaiDoyukai’sreportadvocating
active creation of an integrated East Asian region (Keizai
Doyukai 2006c). Okuda led a high-powered group of eight,
including two respected economists, two prominent former
20 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bureaucrats (Gyoten Toyo of the Ministry of Finance and
OkamotoYukioofForeignAffairs),thechairmanofMitsubishi
Bank, andBankof Japanofficial FukuiToshihiko, soon tobe
namedvicechairofKeizaiDoyukaiandthengovernorofthe
BankofJapan(boj).Duringitsintensiveeleven-dayschedule,
the mission officially met with nearly 200 people in South
KoreaandSoutheastAsia.
As a response to the Asian financial crisis, it is hardly
surprising that the Okuda Report recommends measures to
monitor andmoderate short-term capital flows and calls for
strengthenedJapaneseaidandassistance.Similarly,theappeal
for increased internationalization of the yen trods familiar
ground,while thepush for trade liberalizationand free trade
areasandepasisconsistentwithJapan’snewcampaignofbilat-
eral liberalization and the epa negotiationswithMexico and
Singapore.Eventhereferencesto“thedeepeningofeconomic






In retrospect, though, themost remarkable aspect of the






Community: e Growth of Chinese Power and Japan’s Strategy,
anddrapedwithaneffusiveandaffirmativeblurbfromKeidan-
ren’sOkuda.Kohara highlights the huge increase in regional
trade integration and the influence of the North American
FreeTradeAgreement(nafta)andtheEuropeanUnion.He
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ritualisticallyaffirmstheimportanceofasean,virtuallyignores
Korea, and devotes most of his attention to a sympathetic
recountingofChina’srecovery(復権)ofitsnaturalplaceasthe
centerofAsia.























partnership” with East Asian countries, including a compre-
hensive effort to reduce problems of contending historical
consciousness.Itemphasizesthatthefailureofasean countries,








tial to East Asian stability, by maintaining and upgrading
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec), and supporting
flexible,functionalparticipationofnonregionalcountries.
eDoyukaireportholdsfasttoasetofbasicphilosophical
precepts (理念), including democracy, market economy, and



















Japan to create a more dynamic, flexible, and innovative
economy.e business associations hope that linking Japan
morecloselytoadynamicAsiacanreigniteJapanesegrowth.
Themostimmediatetechniqueissigningeconomicpartner-
shipagreementsthat facilitatethegrowthof Japanese firms,
particularly in industries such as autos and electronics that
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have developed elaborate production networks in Asia that
wouldgainfromincreasedeconomicopennessandintegration.
epas are not limited to East Asia, of course—Mexico was a
crucial early case—but Asian countries have been the most
numerousandimportantpartnersforJapan,andepasareinti-
mately linked to other regional developments, such as the
asean FreeTradeArea(afta).eautoindustry,inparticular,
iscentral to Japan’seconomy,and its leaders,asnotedabove,

















competing site for exportof small vehicles.WhereSoutheast




Japan’s epa negotiations pushed the process further. Al-




or reduced immediately, while most others face elimination
within five to seven years, along with most tariffs on steel
imports(covering50percentofJapanesesteelexportstoai-
land, and63percent toMalaysia).Tariffson remainingparts
and assembly are to expire by 205 (in a few cases, assembly
operationsaresubjecttofuturenegotiations).Inotherwords,













and in 2002 Nissan took a leading stake in Dongfeng, then
China's second largest auto producer. Since then, the major
developmenthasbeentheconglomerationofJapanesefirmsin
Guangdong,arichcoastalprovincefarfromthecentralgovern-
ment.Chinanowhostsmore Japanese parts firms thandoes
theUnitedStates,andGuangdongisovertakingthetraditional
leader,Shanghai.In200,Chinaproducednearlyninemillion
motor vehicles, surpassing Japan as the second largest auto
marketintheworld.Byconservativeestimates,itwillpassthe
UnitedStateswithinadecade.
Building on their overall competitive strengths, Japanese
autofirmsaregainingmarketsharesinChina,andnowcontrol
about one-third of the market. Led by Honda’s Guangzhou
operation, they have already begun small-scale shipments to
Europe and Japan, and they see more exports as inevitable.





and joint venture arrangements for assembly operations; and
thethreatofoverinvestmentbystate-owneddomesticcompa-
nies.eyalsoworryaboutinstabilityinChinesepoliticsand
Sino-Japanese relations. To counteract these dangers and
tensions, they have worked to establish good relations with
local governments—municipal officials in both Tianjin and
GuangzhouseeToyotaandotherJapaneseautomakersascrucial
contributors to the local economy—and to influence central
governments inChina and Japan.Concerns and reservations
notwithstanding,theyclearlyrecognizethecurrentandfuture
centralityofChina to theauto industryand thenecessity for











tivity. In the 0s, it added almost no new capacity, but by
focusing on high quality sheets for the triumphant Japanese
auto industry, it further improved productivity and regained
profitability.
At first, China was a positive factor for Japan. As China
began to reform and open up, demand for Japanese steel
boomed.AconsortiumledbyNipponSteelusedJapaneseloan
aid to construct Baoshan, China’s most advanced mill, in
24 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Noble
Shanghai. e extraordinary expansion of the Chinese steel
industrywasmostlypositive for Japan.True,Chinabegan to
displacesomeimportsfromJapan,and,bybiddingupthecost
of ironore andother inputs, it pressured Japanese steel pro-
ducers,particularlysmallerfirmsproducingordinarysteelfor
theconstructionmarket.Butahugewaveofdemandforsteel
in China drove up prices for steel products throughout the
world.Startingin2003,“Chinademand”helpedpropelJapanese
integratedsteelproducerstorecordprofits.
By2006,however, the riseofChina, theconsolidationof
thesteelindustryinEurope,andthelackofinvestmentinnew
plantsathomemade it clear that Japanwasno longer in the
driver’sseat.Chinaproducedone-thirdofglobaloutput—three
and one-half times as much as Japan—and emerged as the
world’slargestexporter.AlthoughtheChinesemillsremained
far behind Japan in quality assurance, product diversity, and
technological sophistication, theymade steady progress, and
increasingly supplanted imports of cold-rolled steel for auto
bodies and appliances. Posco, the leading steel producer in
South Korea and a vital alliance partner for Nippon Steel,
rapidlyexpandedproductionofsteelinChina,mainlyforautos.
eChinesemarkethasalsobecomecrucialfortheJapa-
nese steel industry. In 2004,NipponSteel took a 3percent
share ina6.5billionyuan (roughly50milliondollars) joint
venture in Shanghai with Baoshan Steel (50 percent) and
Europe'sArcelor(2percent),toproduce.milliontonsannu-
ally of cold-rolled coated sheets for car bodies.Demandhas
beensostrongthattheventureislikelytoexpandproduction.
Baoshan is also producing cold-rolled steel on its own. JFE
Steel,Japan’ssecondlargestproducer,hassoughtforyearsto
obtainpermission tobuild an integratedmill inGuangzhou,
neartheJapaneseauto jointventures. In2006,whilewaiting
for the license, it tookamajorityshare inamoremodest20
billionyenfacilitytocold-roll400,000tonsofsheetsperyear,
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mainlyforauto(DevelopmentBankofJapan2006).In200it
announcedplanstoinvestanother0milliondollarstoproduce




Chinesesteel industry, somefundedby Japaneseaid,arealso
important markets for Japanese steel producers and their
suppliers.ebottomline, though, isclear:China isnowthe
dominantforceintheworldsteelindustry.Japanesefirmsstill
enjoya long lead in technology,but theirdomesticmarket is









about the aging population.ey worry not only about the





subsidiaries in Asia with Japanese-speaking locals capable of









(like most political discourse in Japan, the report studiously
avoidswordssuchas“immigration”and“foreignlabor”;Keidan-




2. percent; (2) create a system of permanent residency to
providegreater stability for foreignworkers; and (3)mobilize
Overseas Development Administration (oda) and other re-
sources to expand Japanese language training overseas, and
prepareforeignprofessionalsinnursingandotherfieldstopass
Japan’s professional qualifications. Keizai Doyukai has issued
severalreportswithcomplementarythemes,includingonewith
the sprightly title “How toMake Japan a PlaceWhereNon-
Japanese People Want to Visit, Study, and Work” (Keizai
Doyukai2002).





years.e agreement mandates three or four years of work
experience (respectively) prior to arrival, stipulates that the
workersbepaidatleastasmuchasequivalentJapanesehealth
employees,andrequiresthatthePhilippineworkerspassprofes-
sional exams in Japanese tomaintain their right to reside in
Japan.11 Interviews with Philippine nurses and care givers
suggestthatevenifnursescouldlearnenoughJapanesetopass
theexams,mostwouldfindJapanlessattractivethantheUnited
Statesor theGulf states,where theycouldspeakEnglishand
earn much higher salaries.e care givers, who have fewer
internationalalternativesandfacelowerlicensingrequirements,
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might find Japan somewhat more attractive (Asahi Shinbun





in expanding the supply of relatively unskilled labor or even
nurses.atismerelyaminorpricetopayforcompletingepas
that facilitate Japanese exports. Indeed, to the extent that
unskilled workers, such as the South Americans of Japanese
descent,haveadifficulttimefittingintoJapanesesociety,large
employerswouldratherlimitordecreasetheirnumberssoas






and theyurge Japaneseuniversities to establishnewEnglish-
basedcoursestoattractforeignstudents.Inearly200,Prime




abroad and in Japan, including changes to evaluation and
compensationsystems,tomakethemselvesmoreattractiveto
foreign students inChina and SoutheastAsia,who currently
prefertoworkforEuropeanandAmericanmultinationals.
In practice, the foreigners that fill Japanese employment
needsathomeandabroadoverwhelminglywillbeAsian,partic-
ularlyChinese.Asof200,over0percentofforeignstudents




another 5 percent. Chinese and Koreans also dominate the
totalforeignpopulationinJapanandthemostskilledvisaposi-
tions, suchas engineer, professor, and intracompany transfer.
On average, Korean students master spoken Japanese most
easily, whereas students from China and Taiwan (the third
largestgroupatfourpercent)havethestrongestcommandof
kanji. Chinese andKoreans are farmore likely to blend into
Japanesesociety,dominatingtherollsofnewlynaturalizedciti-
zens and spouses of Japanese citizens.14 In sum, as Japanese
corporations accelerate their search for foreign students and
professionalswhocanenlivenJapanesecompaniesathomeand
easecommunicationsbetweenJapaneseheadquartersandover-
seas subsidiaries, theywill find themajority of them coming
fromNortheastAsia,particularlyChina.
Conclusion





automobile industries, oftenworking throughKeidanren and
KeizaiDoyukai,andwiththesupportofmeti,havetakenthe




fested intheAsianfinancialcrisis, toregionalization inother





















about China. While unquestionably true, this conclusion
doesnotnegatethelargerpoint:whetherornottheJapanese
likeit,Chinahasalreadyarrivedasamajoreconomicforce.







that China accounts for a rapidly increasing share of the
exportsofJapananditsmostimportanttradepartners.
2. Willbusinesschallenge themainstreamconsensusonthe
necessity ofmaintaining and strengthening theUS-Japan
securityallianceinfavorofamoreexclusivelyAsianorien-
tation?e documents and interviews reveal no sign of
that.Rather,thebusinesscommunityistryingtocarveout





than containment. And the business community is
remindingeveryonethat,inthelong-run,Japanwillhaveto
adjusttoamultipolarworld.
3. WillEastAsiadrop thedollar andmove towardaunified
regionalcurrency?ekeyvariableistheChinesefinancial
system. If andwhenChinacanreform itsbanking system
andbuildup at least amodest bondmarket, it shouldbe
abletorelymoreonflexibleinterestratesandlessonquan-
titativecontrolsandarigidforeignexchangerate(Kroeber
200).OnceChina loosensorbreaks thequasi-peg to the
USdollar,andliberalizesrestrictionsoncapitalflows,other
Asiancountrieswillbemuchmorelikelytocutawayfrom
the dollar, probably initially to a basket of currencies in
which the Euro will compromise a much higher share,









many Japanese academics andpolicy-oriented economists
point to currency unification as an ultimate goal (Shirai
2005). Still, pressure for regional cooperationonfinancial
andmonetarymatterswillincrease(Eichengreen200).As
the regional financial structure evolves, developments in
Beijingwill loomat leastas largeas those inWashington.
Japanesebusinessesarepreparingforthatday.
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WarMemorialonAugust 15, thedateof Japan’s surrender in
WorldWar ii and for Japan’s war victims themost sensitive
dateonwhichsuchavisitmighttakeplace.AlthoughJapanese
publicopinionismildlycriticalofstatevisitstotheshrine,the
samepublicalso shows increasing irritationwithChina’sand
Korea’ssteadydrumbeatofcriticismofanysignofinsufficient
contrition,inshrinevisitsorinhistorytextbooks,forJapan’s
wartime aggressionfifty years ago.Popular comicbooks that
bashChinaandKoreaarealsotroublingsigns(e.g.,Kobayashi
18; Yamano 005). is chapter seeks to understand the
nature of Japan’s new nationalism and the reasons behind it.
What,ifany,istheconnectionbetweenJapan’swrangleswith
its neighbors over wartime history and the Japanese public’s
growing inclination to throwoff the paper constraints of the
constitution’speaceclause?
ereareseveralexplanationsfortherisingtideofnation-
alist feeling in Japan. e first stresses changes in Japan’s

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support on nonmaterial grounds, such as national pride and
identity(Chua00;Shayo005).
0 FrancesRosenbluth,Saito Jun,andAnnalisaZinn
Note: Percentage of respondents who regard themselves patriotic and support Japan’s
permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council.


























Figure 10.1 Strength of patriotism
Both international and domestic levels of analysis afford
trenchant insights into changing Japanese attitudes towards
foreign policy. But there is a puzzling asymmetry in public
opinion across different dimensions of foreign policy that
remainsunexplained.AlthoughJapaneseshowgrowinginterest
in an active foreign policy, proxied in this figure by the per-
centageofrespondentswhothinkJapanshouldbeapermanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, this is not
matchedbyagrowingnationalprideorwillingnesstosupport
thegovernment’sforeignpolicy,“rightorwrong.”
Japan’s national pride, moreover, has not only remained













foreignpolicy interest since the parties on the leftmobilized
studentstodemonstrateagainsttheUS-Japantreatyrevisionin
170.We suggest that voter passivity was the norm because
Japan’selectoral rulesuntil 1gavepoliticiansof the ruling
partyincentivestocultivatedonorsandloyalgroupsofvoters
withregulatoryandpersonalisticfavorsratherthantoappealto
them on the basis of broad policy issues.e electoral rule
changein14didtwothings.Itismoreefficientininterparty
competition for single-member-district or party-list seats to
take a stance on policies, domestic and international. e
Japan’s New Nationalism 1
competitionbetweenthetwolargestpartiespushesplatforms
towardsthemiddleofthepoliticalspectrum,creatingamoder-




If our argument is right, Japanese voter support for an
active security policy reflects a new public engagement with
foreignpolicy issues,whichhasnotbeenpartofthescenein
Japaneseelectoralpoliticsformanyyears.
Sizing up Japanese Nationalism
In common usage, nationalism means something like patri-
otism—an allegiance to one’s nation state, perhaps, but not
necessarily overlaidwith identificationwith an ethnic people
whomakeupthatnation’spopulation(Smith1).Scholarsof
nationalism, including Benedict Anderson (18) and Ernest




Table 10.1: Cross-national comparison of pride in history
Country Agree 1995 (%) Agree 2003 (%) Change (%)
Germany-West 33.7 39.1 5.4
Germany-East 30.9 40.5 9.6
GreatBritain 89.3 88 -1.3
UnitedStates 87.6 92.2 4.6
Sweden 67.3 68.3 1
Russia 81.8 82.6 0.8
Canada 83.8 91.8 8
Japan 76.8 75.6 -1.2
Note: The questionnaire asks if the respondent is proud of the country’s history.
Source: International Social Survey Programme (1995, 2003).
over large territorial spaces in times past. Michael Hechter
(000) and KeithDarden (006) point to the crucial role of
modern governments to inculcate national sentiments that,




insularity made it relatively easy to create and sustain the
culturalhomogeneitythatsupportsasenseofnation(Wilson
001).
Ohnuki-Tierney (00) points out, however, that nation-
alismisadeceptivelyobscureconcept,forourcomfortwiththe
word inordinaryparlanceblindsus to themultipleways the
term is used. Sometimes nationalism refers to the patriotic
supportofapolityinwhichonelives,regardlessoftheparticular
governmentinpower.Nationalismmayalsomeanidentification
with an ethnic people that can border on xenophobia. Still
others mean by nationalism an expansionist ideology that
impliesthewillingnesstouseforceagainstothernationsshould
Japan’s New Nationalism 
Table 10.2: Public support for the government even when it is wrong
Country Agree 1995 (%) Agree 2003 (%) Change (%)
Germany-West 16.7 25.5 8.8
Germany-East 25 26.4 1.4
GreatBritain 24.4 20.7 -3.7
UnitedStates 32 36.4 4.4
Sweden 23.9 14 -9.9
Russia 61.7 57.9 -3.8
Canada 15.3 19.1 3.8
Japan 22.8 24.7 1.9
Note: The questionnaire asks if the respondent should support the government even
if it is wrong.








the Yasukuni war shrine, and growing popular support for












use in Japanese public andprivate school curricula.is is a
role the government education bureaucracy has undertaken





rod for Asian countries’ ire at what they perceive as Japan’s
anemic remorse for the devastation and horrorswreaked on
neighboring countries by the JapanesemilitaryduringWorld
Warii.In18,aparticularlyrancorousexchangeoverJapanese
textbooksledtheJapaneseMinistryofEducationtoincludea
provision in textbook guidelines that the sensitivity of Asian
4 FrancesRosenbluth,Saito Jun,andAnnalisaZinn
nations towartimehistory be taken into account. ButChina






textbook approved by the Japanese government in 001 and
again in 005 that explicitly rejects a “masochistic view” of
history and portrays Japan’s war in Asia in largely defensive
terms.2 In005,theChina Daily calledtheoffendingtextbook
“anunfitteachingtool,”a“politicalprovocation,”andwenton
tocommentthat“withoutaconsensusonthehistoryissueand
other disputes, theAsian peoples cannot place their trust in
Japan’sdesiretoplayabiggerroleinworldaffairs.”(BBCNews
005).Undeterred,theLiberalDemocraticParty(ldp)govern-
ment approved legislation in April 006 that would make
“nurturingloveofcountry”anexplicitaimofpubliceducation.
Forourpurposes,thequestionsarewhetherJapan’stextbook
revisionism is a harbinger of renewed nationalist fervor in








of Japanese brutality in Asia. In most of the municipalities
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5




disregard for the feelings ofAsian populations victimized by
Japanesemilitaryexpansion,theyviewofficialvisitsbyJapanese
politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine as bald endorsements of
Japan’s militarist past at the highest levels of power. Prime
MinisterKoizumiJun’ichirovisitedYasukuniShrineeveryyear
whilehewasinoffice,from001to006.Moreexasperatingly
to Japan’s Asian neighbors, he often paid an official visit on
August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender, which also
happenstobethedayAsiancountriescelebratetheendofthe
war.egovernmentsofChinaandKoreaissuedformalprotests
at each of Koizumi’s official visits, and, in 005, Korea tem-
porarilywithdrew its ambassador to Japan to underscore the
point.
Itmaybe,assomeobservershavenoted,thattheChinese
and Korean governments enjoy the popular support in their
countries that Japanese insensitivity generates for them (Wi-
dome 006). But, at a minimum, official visits to Yasukuni





nationalism. If support for Yasukuni visits was already high,
politicians could score easy points by braving foreign ire to
makethetrip.Alternatively,perhapsthegovernmentsoughtto
stoke nationalism as a way of distracting the public from
economicwoes,particularlythoseatthelosingendofeconomic
restructuring, if economic losers are more likely to identify




to a winning cause, or perhaps politicians have managed to
stokenationalistopinionasawaytogeneratepoliticalsupport
aroundnonmaterialissues.
at Japanese public opinion, particularly among urban
voters,hasremainedmildlynegativetowardstheseofficialvisits






Shrine.HojoKakutaro, chairmanof the JapanAssociationof
CorporateExecutives(KeizaiDoyukai)followedsoonthereafter
withasimilarstatement.
emajority of ldp Diet members do not, in fact, visit
YasukuniShrine.ldp Dietmembers’visitstoYasukuniinrecent
yearsdonotindicateanupwardtrajectory,anditseemsclear
that ldp members are sensitive to the range of viewswithin
theirconstituenciesaboutYasukuni.Considerthebehaviorof
ldp incumbents in the summerof 004.eportionof ldp
Dietmemberswhoshowedupinpersonorsenttheirproxiesto
the shrineonAugust 15 for thewardefeat anniversary event
Japan’s New Nationalism 7
Note: The questionnaire asks, “Are you in support of the recent prime minister’s
visit to Yasukuni Shrine?”
Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun, October 7, 1985; August 17, 2006.
Table 10.3: Public opinion concerning prime ministers’ 




September 21–22, 1985 51.7% 24.9% 23.5% 2,257




who are enthusiastic about increasing governmental involve-
mentinYasukuni,butalsobyothercompetingreligioussects
thatadvocateestablishmentofanonreligiouscommemorative
facility for war casualties. Soka Gakkai is among the largest
non-Shintoist group and the organizational cornerstone of
KomeiParty, the ldp’s junior coalitionpartner since 1.A
significantportionofldp legislators sent theirproxies to the
shrine insteadofshowingup inperson:5.7%of lowerhouse
single-memberdistrict(smd)incumbentsand.5%ofupper
house district incumbents. By sending a proxy, the legislator
wastryingtomaintainafriendlyrelationshipwiththeShintoists.
By not appearing in person, they avoided blame from Soka
Gakkaiandotherreligiousgroups.3




on symbolic issues, such as the Yasukuni Shrine, which had
deepandspecialmeaningforruralvoters.PrimeMinisterAbe
ShinzowasamoregenuinebelieverinwhatHarveyMansfield
would call “amanly history” of Japan. But the voting public







Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justiceandorder,theJapanesepeopleforeverrenouncewar
8 FrancesRosenbluth,Saito Jun,andAnnalisaZinn
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
forceasmeansofsettlinginternationaldisputes.Inorderto
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
andair forces, aswell asotherwarpotential,willneverbe
maintained.erightofbelligerencyofthestatewillnotbe
recognized.
A peace pledgemade sense to the victors in 147 seeking to
avoid thepossibilityof resurgent Japanesemilitarism,but,by
150 when the United States had changed its priority to
combatingcommunismworldwide,theAmericanswouldhave
preferred for Japan to put considerable resources into US-
directedmilitaryspending.But,unlikeotherdemocratization
measures such as economic deconcentration, constitutional
entrenchment of the peace pledge in the form of Article ix
made remilitarization difficult for theAmericans to demand.
PrimeMinister Yoshida Shigeru won his place in history by




as possible on defensewhile paying asmuch as necessary to
keep the United States willing to hold the nuclear umbrella,





world, after theUnited States. To be sure, Russia andChina
havefarmoremilitarypersonnelunderarms,andJapanlacks
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that is alreadyhere: Japan is anenormous,butdefensiveand
status-quo-favoringmilitarypower,andArticleix isaflagrant
falsehood.egroups that favor goingnuclearorpreach the




































Figure 10.2 Public opinion concerning constitutional revision
interests in the Asian/Pacific region. Meanwhile, the rise of








system and the relative distribution of capabilities or power
amongthem(Waltz17).NeorealistKennethWaltzpredicted
that Japan would possess a nuclear weapon sooner or later
(Waltz 1). States with similar capabilities seek to balance
oneanotherinanattempttoavoidwar,whereasweakerstates,
againinanattempttoavoidwar,eitherbandwagonwiththeir










Unbalanced systems can also be marked by the security












Itmay be that Japan increasingly viewsChina’s quest for
regionalhegemony inAsiawith alarmbecause risingpowers
tend to be “revisionist” or inclined to change the status quo
throughterritorialoreconomicexpansionism.isyields the
following Neorealist Hypothesis: Japan’s quest for “normal
country”statusismotivatedbyitsdesiretocreateabalanced











we should observe that Japan’smilitary build up has been in
responsetoincidentsoftensionwithChinaandNorthKorea.
e rising public support in Japan for an active foreign





the international scene as a great power.e government, it













conception of the temporality of culture. Postwar pacifism is






e flaw in this argument is that support for an active




Note: The questionnaire asks, “Should the capacity of the Self-Defense Forces be in-
creased, stay the same, or be reduced?”
Source: Cabinet Office (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-bouei/2-3.html).




same Shrink Don’t know number
20–29 9.8% 62.1% 8.5% 19.6% 235
30–39 15.4% 62.1% 11.1% 11.4% 298
40–49 10.6% 64.7% 13.3% 11.4% 360
50–59 18.5% 62.3% 6.3% 12.9% 459
60–69 17.2% 60.5% 7.7% 14.6% 466
70+ 20.5% 59.1% 3.9% 16.6% 308
Allages 16.5% 65.7% 9.4% 8.3%
Total 2,126
Electoral Competition and Political Discourse
While theremaybe elementsof truth inboth the externalist
and cultural explanations of Japanese nationalism, the “cool
nationalism”wehaveoutlinedpointstoathirdfactor:therules
ofelectoralcompetition,inplacesince14,thatpushpoliticians
to take a stand on issues of national significance, whether
foreignordomesticpolicy.Before14,Japan’smulti-member
districtelectoralrulesforcedanypartyseekingtogainormain-














foreignpolicy expertisehad scant electoral value to Japanese






candidates of the same party. In the place of the old multi-
memberdistricts,thenewsystemcombines00single-member
districts with 180 seats allocated to party lists according to











in home districts: agriculture, construction, and commerce.
erewaslittledemandamongldp memberstositonforeign
affairs or defense committees because they came with little







records of committeemembership. But a look at committee
chairmanships suggests that, unlike prior to electoral reform
whencommitteechairmentendedtobesecond-tierldp leaders,














Japan’snewnationalism,wehaveargued, is adecidedly “cool
nationalism” that reflects thecalculationsofanewlyengaged
citizenryaboutappropriateresponsestoJapan’schanginginter-
nationalenvironment. Japan’sgeopoliticalcircumstancespro-
vide grist for domestic debate, but it is the new electoral
environmentathomethatgivespoliticiansanincentivetodraw






Opinionpolls showno signsof growingnationalprideor an
edgydiscomfortwiththegeopoliticalstatusquothatcouldspill








Politics isnotonlyaboutcoolcalculations; it isofcourse
possible that Japan’s nationalism could turn hot under some
conditions. Although there are few signs yet of politicians




Korea’s constant harping could grow into full blown fury.
Nationalism inChinaandKorea,bycomparisonwith that in
Japan,is“hot”inthesensethatittranslatesintohighvaluesof
national pride and is easilymobilized for angry protests and
46FrancesRosenbluth,Saito Jun,andAnnalisaZinn




ere are, nevertheless, reasons to doubt thehotnation-

















depiction of Japanese military brutality in the war against China




during a sabbatical year in theUnited States. Formore about this











nese opinion polls, the Soviet shooting down of a Korean civilian
aircraft in 18 did not translate into a desire for a more active
securitypolicy.
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certainly perfected it, introducing a practice of twice-daily
appearancesinfrontoftelevisioncameras.Subsequentprime




posters. Even when there is no election, we see fashionably
dressedprimeministersmodelingingovernment-issuedadver-
tisementsaboutenergyconservationandthetourismindustry.
More importantly, however, Japanese political leaders are







Japan’s New Executive Leadership: 
How Electoral Rules 









making frequent appeals to, of all things, their foreign policy
expertise.
ereareseveralreasonsforthischange:theendoftheUS-
Soviet bipolar system; the emergence of external threats,
including terrorismand theproliferationofweaponsofmass













both institutions have experiencedmajor reforms since the
mid-990s, significantly altering the parameters of politics.
We attribute the recent emergence of increasingly “extro-
verted”JapanesepoliticalleadersandtheexpansionofJapan’s
globalsecuritycommitmentstothenewinstitutionalcontext
thatemergedasa resultof thesechanges,and to theriseof
political leaders who were able to take advantage of these
institutions.1
Obviously,issuesofnationalsecurity,defense,andforeign



















foreign policy issues have come to be regarded by Japanese
politicians.Forpoliticianswhoaspiretoascendtotheleadership
positionsintheirrespectivepartiesortobecomeprimeminister,





more openly about their positions on security concerns and
foreignpolicyissues.Undertheoldelectoralrules—medium-
sized,multi-memberdistrictscombinedwithasinglenontrans-
ferable vote—these issues were totally disjointed from any
electoral efforts. Any engagement with security and foreign
policy issuessimplymeant“wastedefforts”as faraselection-
eering by the ldp politicians was concerned. Security and
foreign policy issues were also secondary concerns for any
ambitiouspolitical leader aspiring tobecomeprimeminister.
Foralongtime,theracetothethronehadbeendeterminednot
bypolicyexpertise,demonstratedcapacityto leadthenation,
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Politics Under the Old Electoral System
Almost twentyyearsago,KentCalderobserved inhis classic
bookonJapanesepolitics,Crisis and Compensation,thatJapan’s
oldelectoralsystemwasnotconducivetopoliticians’involve-
ment in security and foreign policy issues.2 His chapter on
foreign policy, appropriately titled “e Residual: Defense,”
discusseshowitwasnotintheinterestofJapanesepoliticians
toinvesttheirtimeandinfluenceindefensepolicymatters.e
old electoral system combined medium-sized multi-member
districtswithasinglenon-transferablevote(mmd/sntv).Under
thissystem,avotercouldcastonlyonevoteforonecandidate
in an electoral districtwhere there are pluralwinners. Votes
once cast for one candidate were not transferable to others,
4 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
evenwhentheformeralreadyhadenoughvotestowin.Fora
politicalparty,gainingmorethanonewinnerfromalmostevery
district was necessary to form an absolute majority of the
House.However,onlytheldp wasinapositiontotakeadvan-
tageofthissystem.Becauseitwasabletofieldmultiplecandi-








dates either had to state a position in accordance with their
party’splatform,whichpreventedthemfromemphasizingtheir
differences,oradheretodifferentforeignandsecuritypolicies
and risk making the party incoherent. For politicians cam-
paigninginammd/sntv system,discussionsofforeignaffairs
and security policies added little in the way of advantage to
one’scampaign.









should specialize in “divisible” policy areas to maximize the
overallldp’sseatshare.Suchastrategypermittedmultipleldp
Diet members within the same electoral district to co-exist:
they could either develop their own political machines in
Japan’s New Executive Leadership 
differentgeographicalareaswithinthesamedistrict(centered
in their home towns, for example), or specialize in sectoral
policyareas,suchasagriculture,construction,orcommerceto
divide up the conservative constituencies within the same
district.3 In general, however, under this system, legislators
tendedtobecomeindifferenttolarge-scalenationalandglobal
policies, involved as they were in providing “pork-barrel”
programstotheirlocalelectorate.Securityandforeignpolicies,
considered to be more “indivisible” policies, simply did not
generateelectoraladvantageundertheoldelectoralsystem.





dinator among the small parties.e combination of mmd/







their influence over the selection of the next party president
(that is, theprimeminister).e factionnotonlyaided indi-
vidualcandidatesinelectoralcampaigns,butalsohelpedthem
infundraisingandtheallocationofpositionswithintheldp
and the cabinet. Habatsu factions functioned essentially as
mini-partieswithintheldp.
Despite their usefulness under the mmd/sntv, factions
cameataprice.eyweakened theldp party leadershipand




withhim.Faction leadersdirectly controlled the rank-and-file
butnotthepartyleadership.ismeantthatnodecisioncould
bereachedwithouttheirconsent.Factionleaders,inturn,made








best to tie the hands of the party president and the prime
minister by institutionalizing the presence of multiple veto
playerswithintheldp government.Duringthepostwarperiod,
the selection of the ldp president typically took the form of
back-stage negotiations among faction leaders or elections
whose rules favored votes by habatsu factions. ese rules




their candidacy for the Party Presidential race. Although the
rules changed from time to time, for most of the postwar
period,theelectionoftheldp partypresident involvedvotes
bylocalldp branchesandDietmembers.Intheactualcounting
of the votes,Dietmembers’ voteswere givenheavierweight.
is ensured that faction leaderswhocontrolled thevotesof
theirmembers gained a disproportionate power to influence
theoutcome.
By facilitating the entrenchment of numerous political
factions and interests, the mmd/sntv system allowed small
parties towin seats in theDiet, thus rendering it difficult to
replacetheexistinggovernment.Liketheproportionalrepre-
sentation system,whichdistributes seats topartiesaccording
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primeminister one day. It was not a photogenic face, policy
expertise, or communication skills that recommendedone to
becomeaprimeminister;ratheritwasamassingpoliticalcapital
within the confines of habatsu factions that increased one’s
chance ofmaking it to the top.e complex set of rules for
electing an ldp party president—the prime minister—also
ensured that therewas no link between a voter’s choice of a
candidate in her own electoral district and the actual Prime
MinisterelectedbytheDiet.










pr districts (=district magnitude ranging from  to 9). e
LowerHousepr systempermitsvoterstocasttheirvoteonlyfor
aspecificpartyratherthananindividualcandidate.
Although theLowerHousebegan implementing amixed
systeminthe99elections,theUpperHousehadalreadybeen
MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
using a similar system since 93.As a result of the changes
implementedinthatyear,roughlyone-fifthoftheUpperHouse
was elected in smd,with the remaining four-fifths elected in
mmd using two different methods: two-fifths of the Upper
Housewereelectedintheoldmmd/sntv districts,whereasthe
remaining two-fifthswere elected by the proportional repre-
sentationrulewithaclosedpartylist.4
e elimination of intraparty competition at the polls—
completelyfromtheLowerHouseandthree-fifthsintheUpper
House—significantlyaffectedintrapartydynamics.Itremoved
institutional obstacles that had weakened the previous ldp







duced strict age restrictions in the pr-tier. Unlike in the
medium-sized,multi-member districts,where individual ldp
politicians “owned” their home grounds, the party began to
assert its “propertyright”oversmds.Whereas factions could






Moreover, political parties began buckling down, issuing






















Nothingdemonstrated the full impactof the institutional
change and the newly strengthened power of the executive
more than what happened in the 00 general elections.
Koizumi Jun’ichiro, the ldp president at the time, refused to
nominateldp incumbentswho,asofficialldp candidates,had
opposed his postal service-privatization policies.9 Instead, he
recruitednew faces fromthebureaucracy, academia, and the






















later joined the dpj hold considerable policymaking power
within the party, they promised in the process of forming a
jointparliamentarygroupin99tofollowpoliciesproduced





the resistanceof leftist parties toward security enhancement.
esefactorshavecombinedtogivetheprimeministeramore
favorable environment in which to expand security commit-
mentsifhedeemsitnecessary.
New Incentives for Rank-and-File and Ambitious Politicians
Sincethe99elections,themajorityofpoliticianshaverunas
the single official party in smd orpurely on theparty ticket.
(e Upper House changed its rules in 003 to reintroduce
sntv inthe0-member-seat,nationwidedistrict.)reeimpor-
tantchangesoccurredasaresult.One,rank-and-filepoliticians
developed a strong preference for a popular policy platform
andpartypresident.echangeintheincentivesoftherank-
and-fileeventually ledtochanges inthemethodstoelect the
ldp partypresident.Two,thenewsmd andtheclosedpartylist
pr removedoldconstraintsonindividualpoliticians,makingit




tional context has also changed the calculations of ldp Diet
members who are aspiring to become party president (i.e.,
primeminister).
e new preference for “popular” party leaders
enewelectoralsystemhasincreasedtheelectoralimportance
ofthepartyleader.Nowvoterscasttheirvotenotonlyforone
of multiple ldp district candidates on the basis of personal
connections,butalsoforaspecificparty(asintheclosedparty
listpr-tier)orforasinglepartycandidate(inthesmd-tier).In
the closed party list pr-tier, voters have only cues from the
partyleader’sstatementsandanyformalorinformalpartyplat-
form that a specific party puts out. In the smd-tier, even a
popular,well-knownindividualcandidatehastorunasanoffi-
cial party candidate if she is to be effective at all as a Diet
member.Forlesswell-knowncandidates,thereputationoftheir








becoming both a good prime minister and appealing to the
electorate. e increased importance of the party president
with regard to theelectoral fortunesof the rank-and-filealso
broughtaboutafurtherweakeningofthefactionsasamecha-
nismtoselectpartyleaders.In99,forthefirstldp presidential
election that took place after the 994 electoral reform, the
rank-and-file strongly opposed the usual behind-the-scenes
 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
negotiationsamongfactionleaderstoselectanewpartypresi-
dent.Electionswerethuscalled,andcandidatessuchasKoizumi







instead. In the process of selecting a party president, policy
debates also surged in importance. Again, this is consistent
withthefactthattherank-and-fileneedeitherapopularleader
or a popular policy platform to advance their own electoral
chances.Figure.showsthatpublicdebatesamongcandidates
fortheldp partypresidencybecameanewnormafter99.
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Note: The black bar represents the number of times debates among candidates for
the LDP presidential race were televised. The gray bar represents the overall TV cov-
erage of the presidential race, as listed in TV Guide. Only those years in which the
LDP held elections to select their leader are included.




Figure 11.1 Media coverage of LDP presidential race
e removal of disincentives for cultivating security-related
policy expertise
Policyareassuchasdefense,securityandforeignpoliciesused
to be very unpopular among ldp Diet members. is was
becausepoliciesthataddressedthecollectivegoodofthewhole
nationwere “nondivisible” and so gave zero electoral returns
under the mmd/sntv mechanism, which required constant
oilingofone’spersonalpoliticalmachinebydistributing“pork.”
Undertheoldelectoralrules,anytimeandeffortspentculti-








security and foreign policies that have taken place since the
4 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
Table 11.1: Comparison of experience of the posts related to the policy of













9–99 30.0% 36.4% 60.0% 33.3%
Post-electoralreform,




75.0% 60.0% 75.0% 20.0%
Source: Kokkai Binran.
Note: The first period is from the Suzuki Zenko cabinet to the first Hashimoto
Ryutaro cabinet. The second period is from the second Hashimoto Ryutaro cabinet
to the first Obuchi Keizo cabinet. The third period is from the first Obuchi Keizo
cabinet (re shuffled) to the Abe Shinzo cabinet.
institutional reforms also support the view presented here
(Table .andTable.).
Furthermore,thedemiseofthefactionsandnewpolitical
reforms that strengthened thepositionofpoliticiansvis-à-vis
the bureaucracy also increased the political value of gaining
policyexpertise.Recallthatundertheoldmmd/sntv system,
electoral needs necessitated the presence of factions. As was
previously argued, with the main institutional infrastructure
eliminatedasaresultofthe994reforms,factionscontinuedto
weaken.ismeantthatfactionsalsobegantolosecontrolover
the allocation of positions within the ldp and the cabinet.
Under the faction-based allocation of positions, one’s policy
expertisemattered very little.As thepolitical fortunes of the
factionswaned,otherimportantpoliticalreformswereimple-
mentedthatfurtherweakenedfaction-basedpolitics.Putsimply,
these reforms increased possible political return on policy
expertiseandweregenerallyaimedatconcentratingpowerin
thehandsofelectedofficialsratherthanbureaucrats.
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Source: Kokkai Binran.
Note: The first period is from the Suzuki Zenko’s cabinet to the first Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s cabinet. The second period is from the second Hashimoto Ryutaro’s
cabinet to the first Obuchi Keizo’s cabinet. The third period is from the first Obuchi
Keizo’s cabinet (reshuffled) to the Abe Shinzo’s cabinet.














9–99 6.05 20.0% 0.0% 30.0%
Post-electoralreform,




6.38 37.5% 25.0% 75.0%
As part of these reforms, the government commissioner
(seifu-iin) system was abolished, whereby bureaucrats were
appointedasspecialcommissionerstotakepartinDietsessions




disincentives for policy specialization. Furthermore, in the





New incentives for the ambitious
echangesdiscussedsofarhavealsoaffectedthemostambi-
tiousoftheDietmembers—thepartyleaderorprimeminister









his party win the election. Figure . illustrates how prime
ministers have become increasingly exposed to the media,
providing evidence to the claim put forth here that the new




policy issuesahighlydesirable tool forcandidates todemon-
 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
stratetheirleadershipqualities.Itisimportanttonoteherethat
the top-down nature of certain policy issue areas has made
them attractive policy areas for the leader to fall back on.
FormerPrimeMinistersKoizumiJun’ichiro’sandAbeShinzo’s
attentiontotheissueofthekidnappingofJapanesenationalsby
North Korean authorities in the 90s and 90s provides a
goodexampleofthisnewextroversioninresponsetointerna-
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Source: Ikuo Kabashima Seminar’s data on the number of times Prime Minister and
his cabinet was listed in the program guide for the four major news shows. The
figure was provided to Estévez-Abe by Taku Sugawara, and is based on the data col-
lected by students in Ikuo Kabashima’s seminar.
Note: Tokudane, Za Waido, NewsStation (Ni) and News23 are all names of TV news
programs. The figure was provided to Estévez-Abe by Taku Sugawara, and is based
on the data collected by students in Ikuo Kabashima's seminar.





Tokudane Za Waido Ni News23
Figure 11.2 Media exposure of prime ministers
Institutional Resources 
and the Prime Minister’s New Capabilities
JohnCampbelloncecalledJapanesedefensepolicy“thepolitics
of indecision.”13 e 99 GulfWar was one example of this
indecisiveness,whenJapan’sfinancialcontributionstotheAllied
forces (in excess of $ billion) were criticized as being “too
little,toolate.”Alackofprimeministerialleadership,theinat-
tentionofrank-and-filepoliticians,andbureaucraticturfbattles
were cited as primary reasons for the Japanese government’s
failuretorespondtothecrisis.
Japan’sresponseafterthe9/attackscameinstarkcontrast
to the case of the GulfWar.Within a week, PrimeMinister
KoizumiannouncedtheSevenBasicMeasuresoftheJapanese
government,which included sending the SelfDefense Forces















Enhanced statutory authority of the cabinet and its secretariat
AlthoughtheJapanesegovernmenthadundergonecontinuous
small administrative reforms since the 90s to enhance the
powerofthecabinetandtheprimeminister,itwasHashimoto










cabinet secretary, giving them the “right to propose (hatsugi
ken)”importantbasicpoliciesatcabinetmeetings15 andto“plan
and draft plans (kikaku ritsuan).16” ese changes gave the
cabinet secretariat legal authority to initiatepolicy independ-
entlyfromministriesandtopresideoverthepolicy-makingand
coordinationprocess.
Since then,more than tenpiecesof legislationhavebeen
initiatedandadministeredbythecabinetsecretariat,including
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 00.17 Before
000,onlytwolawswereadministered(shokan)bythecabinet
secretariat—the Cabinet Law, and the Law on the Security
Council of Japan. From the point of view of the individual












the government initiated a bill, the relevant ministry would





ership in the legislativeprocess is enhanced,whereas theold
zoku influence isdiminished.ecabinetsecretariat,with its
new statutory authority and with the blessing of the prime
minister,could()gaininformalcabinetapprovalbeforenego-
tiationwiththeparty,()dealwithmultiplezoku atonceand
diminishonezoku’s leverage,and (3)prior to introductionof
thebilltotheDietandevenpriortonegotiationwiththeldp,





Enhanced organizational capacity of the cabinet secretariat
Strengthenedstatutoryauthoritydoesnotguaranteeenhanced
cabinetleadershipunlessthosewhosupportthecabinet,politi-












to the primeminister and has, in effect, become the deputy
primeminister.20
0 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
eroleoftheadministrativeDeputyChiefCabinetSecre-
























prime minister.21 In addition, the prime minister could now
appointuptofivespecialadvisorsinsteadofthree.eappoint-
ment ofOkamoto Yukio, a formerMinistry of ForeignAffairs
(mofa)official,tobeinchargeofIraqreconstructionduringthe
Koizumi administration is one example. Evenmore significant,
perhaps,isthatthethreenewpositionsofassistantchiefcabinet
secretarieshavebecomepoliticallyappointedpositions.
e second measure to assist the prime minister was a
drasticorganizationalreshuffling.ethreeofficesofInternal
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Affairs (headed by a Ministry of Finance official), External
Affairs (ForeignAffairs), andNationalSecurityAffairs (Japan
DefenseAgency)wereabolishedandreplacedbythreeAssistant
ChiefCabinetSecretary(naikaku kanbo fukuchokan ho)posi-






wereestablished for issues involvingmore thanoneministry.
esegroupsareformedanddissolvedasnecessary,andtheir
legalstandingsvarybylaws,governmentorders,orwithoutany




ird, the Security Council of Japan, long considered an
ineffective,rubber-stampinginstitution,gainedanewlife.Estab-
lished in 9 as theDefenseCouncil, the SecurityCouncil’s








eSecurityCouncil, however, did little of that.Defense
Council (later Security Council) meetings were not held at
times when important security policy decisions were made,




three timesper year, primarily todiscussmatters concerning
thedefensebudget.Furthermore,duetoitsinstitutionallegacy
of having been established to restrain the power of Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru and the pre-war military, it was





nizational capacityof the cabinet secretariat,whichhad long









that theSecurityCouncil is inchargeof identifyinganemer-
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ecabinetsecretariatisnowinchargefromthebeginningto
the end, giving the primeministermore capacity to exercise
top-downleadership.
Japan’s ideal circumstances for reform
It is important to point out that although these institutional




bubblewas great enough to drive the public, the politicians,
andthebureaucratstobelievethatJapanneededto“trimthe
fat”fromthegovernmentandreorganizeittobemoreefficient





istrative reform, since he had finished privatization of the
nationalrailwaysin9astheMinisterofTransport.Hashi-
moto once stated that he would achieve the administrative
reformevenifhewere“coveredwithflames.”
On the other hand, it is unclearwhether hewas able to
takeadvantageoftheenhancedpoweroftheprimeminister-
ship and presidency provided by the administrative and the
electoralreforms.Hefacedseriousstruggleswithldp members
whose vested interests would be damaged by the reforms.
ese struggleswere often reported through themedia, but









reforms in publicwhereno onewould dare to oppose them,
theyresisted the leaderwhenthereformsbrought themsub-
stantialdetriments.Atanyrate,Hashimotosuccessfullylaidall
thegroundworkforthereform.However,becauseheleftoffice
after a loss in theUpperHouse election in 99, he did not
enjoythebenefitsofthenewsystemcreatedthroughthereforms
hehadlaboredtoinstall.24






Administrative Change and Increased Security Commitments





It is hard to tell whether Obuchi Keizo, who succeeded









twicebeforefinallywinning in00. Inhis losses,hehadthe
smallestnumberofvotesamongthecandidatesbecausehedid
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Koizumi himself.27 He finally won first place in 43 out of 4















administrative decentralization, regulatory reform, reform of
thetaxationsystem,privatizationofthepostalsystem,economic
growthstrategies,andsoon.




top-down decision-making style.28 Although he often faced
resistancefromtheldp aswellasfromoppositionparties,he
overcame it with his authorized power and strong public
support.29 ldp Dietmemberswereafraidthatstrongresistance
toKoizumiwouldpotentiallykeepthemoffthe listofofficial
nominees and lead to the erosion of their public support. In






which includedKoizumi visiting Pyongyang on two separate
occasions,waslednotbytheForeignMinistrybut,infact,by
thecabinetsecretariat.31 IntheprocessoflegislatingtheSpecial
Anti-Terrorism Law, Koizumi gained the consent of the ldp





nary explanation to the ruling parties.33 All of these actions





Koizumi. Within the Minister of Defense’s new, expanded
responsibilitieswere the right to call cabinetmeetings,make
budget requests to the Ministry of Finance, and even enact
ministryordinancesunderhis/herownname.
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Moreover, it was under Koizumi that the possibilities of
establishing aNational SecurityCouncil of Japan (tentatively
jnsc)modeledafterthatoftheUnitedStates,andofdeveloping
high quality intelligence services, began to be discussed. Al-
though they havenot yet been realized, the government, the
ldp,andeventhedpj arecurrentlydevelopingstudiesonthese
issues.34 If the jnsc and intelligence community were estab-




security policies of Japan were achieved under Koizumi’s
administration, from 00 to 00. is might be simply
becausehistermwaslongerthanthoseofhispredecessorsor
because a cluster of external demands occurred during the
period.However,itisalsoplausiblethathisinitiative,powered




slow-moving decision-making process. Koizumi actually uti-
lizedthenewsetof institutionstorespondtotheattackson
September,00.
Antiterrorism Legislation after 9/11: A Case Study
eJapanesegovernmentrespondedtotheattacksonSeptem-
berinwaysunthinkableinthepastintermsofspeed,content,
performance, and, most importantly, in terms of who “took
charge.” e top-down legislative procedure instituted by





Stage I: Immediate response and pre-Diet negotiation





• e Security Council was effectively used by the prime
ministertospeedupthelegislativeprocedure.
• e influence of ldp politicians was intentionally mini-
mized.
First,thestaffofthecabinetsecretariatrespondedswiftly
and effectively immediately afternewsof the attack came in.
is response was facilitated by the newly enhanced organi-
zationalcapabilities.FurukawaTeijiro,theDeputyChiefCabinet
Secretary (administrative), initiatedwhatwas later called the
Furukawa Study Group, bringing together two bureau chiefs




















suggested that this process—convening the Security Council
immediately after a crisis, drafting guidelines for a response,








Bukai within the ldp. In addition, because everyone agreed
that speedwas important, a joint councilmeeting (including
Defense, Foreign Affairs, and cabinet committees) was held,




and the government plan had been effectively draftedwithin
thecabinetsecretariat,ratherthaninseparateministries.





Within the Diet, the cabinet secretary and the prime
minister himself fielded the most difficult questions on the
responseplan,whereastheDefenseAgencyandmofa officials
provided information on the details.is happened because
thecabinetsecretariatsponsoredthebill(inhiscapacityasthe
0 MargaritaEstévez-Abe,Hikotani Takako,Nagahisa Toshio
bill’sinitiatorandadministrator),buttheprocesshadtheadded
effect of giving the impression to the public that the prime
ministerandhiscabinetwerefullyincharge.
Second, speed was prioritized over full consensus. Once
again, Koizumi and his staff did not try very hard to gain
support from unsatisfied ldp partymembers or to come up
with a compromise with the dpj. In the end, public opinion
polls show that this strategydidnothurt theprimeminister













ii have likely pressured Japan to increase its security efforts.
Most Japanese people feel external threats and express their








government has gained an improved capability for quick,
effectiveaction.Furthermore,theprimeministercanaccentuate









process in Japan and has a few notable implications for the
alliancerelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.
First, theshift frombureaucratictopolitical leadershipin
defenseandforeignpolicymeansthatmoreactorswillbeinter-
ested in getting involved in defensematters. Althoughmore
attentionshouldgenerallymeananincreasedappreciationfor





decisively (as in the caseof sending sdf troops to Iraq).e




































had little effect on highly concentrated parties such as the Japan
CommunistParty(jcp)andtheCleanGovernmentParty(Komeito).
ejcp inparticularhasalwayshadasoundfinancialbasisbasedon








4 efinalreportfromGyosei kaikaku kaigi (theAdministrativeReform
Conference)publishedinDecember99.
 RevisedArticle4ofCabinetLaw.









 Jitai taisho senmon iinkai consists of a Deputy Cabinet Secretary
(political),aDeputyCabinetSecretary(administrative),naikaku kiki
kanri kan, naikaku kanbo fukuchokan ho, naikaku joho kan,bureau-
chief (kyokucho) level bureaucrats from the Ministry of Defense,
NationalPoliceAgency,CoastGuard,MinistryofLandandTrans-
portation,ResourceandEnergyAgency,MinistryofEconomicsand
Industry, Ministry of Finance (Director of Customs Bureau and
zaimukan),mofa,MinistryofJustice,shobocho,andtheChiefofthe
General StaffOffice.ere is also a subcommittee (director level),
calledtherenraku chosei kaigi.
 eproposalbytheformerPrimeMinsterAbe’sexpertstudygroup
toestablisha “NationalSecurityCouncil” isnot somucha radical
departurefromthepast,asoftenreported,butratheracontinuation
oftherecentchangesdiscussedabove.emaindifferencesare:()
fewer official members of the Security Council (prime minister,
cabinetsecretary,foreignminister,defenseminister,plusmoreminis-
ters as deemed necessary); () politicians as National Security
Advisors (instead of politically appointed Assistant Chief Cabinet












































3 MasahiroAkiyama, thenDirectorofDefensePolicyBureauof the
Japan Defense Agency (jda), calls this shift “from administrative
alliance to political alliance.” He reflects that he wrote a letter to
JosephNyein99duringtheSpecialActionCommitteeonOkinawa
(saco) negotiations mentioning that it may be the last time that
bureaucrats have the “silent leadership” over defense policy, given
Japan’s New Executive Leadership
the increasing tendency of politicians to take the lead in defense
policy.Itisinterestinginretrospectthathehadpredictedwhatwas
likelytohappennext.SeeAkiyamapp.,00.
39 Reisen go no Jieitai to Shakai: Jieikan Bunmin Elito Ishiki Chosa no
Bunseki (e self defense forces and society after the Cold War:
analysisofthesdf officer-civilianeliteopinionsurvey),withHitoshi
Kawano.Boei Daigakko Kiyo 9:March00.
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